Note: I am travelling (Pacific time zone) until August 10. Posting will be irregular and possibly limited by time and equipment constraints.
July Employment: That Was Sahm Jobs Reports
The ongoing deterioration in the jobs market was on full display in the July Employment report. Nonfarm payrolls expanded by just 114K, well below consensus expectations for a 175K gain and close to the smallest monthly gain this cycle. Revisions were minimal relative to the last two months’ downward adjustment of 111K, but were once again negative with the net change the prior two months lowered by 29K. Over the past three months, payrolls have expanded at an average monthly pace of 170K, down from 267K in the first quarter and 251K in 2023.
(…) the jump in the unemployment rate to 4.3% from 4.1% in June cannot be explained away by the hurricane. The increase in unemployment from 3.5% this time last year is more concerning because the unemployment rate tends to vacillate little throughout the business cycle. Rising unemployment can set off a negative feedback loop between income, spending and hiring.
This dynamic has put a spotlight on the “Sahm Rule,” which highlights the historical pattern that the unemployment rate has never risen 0.5 points above its prior 12-month low (when measured on a three-month average basis) without the economy being in a recession.
July’s unemployment rate reading has pushed the Sahm Rule indicator to 0.53, above its 0.5 point threshold. As we discussed in a recent report, the increase in unemployment has been driven more by entrants into the labor force than at the start of prior recessions. In July, new and re-entrants accounted for 22 bps of the rise in the Sahm Rule indicator over the past year, more than its contribution in the first month of each of the past seven recessions.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics
This increase in unemployment for the “right” reasons suggests that the crossing of the 0.5 point threshold may not be the sure-fire sign of recession that it has been in the past. That said, unemployment due to a permanent job loss or completion of temporary work has also risen significantly over the past year, including another increase in July. This increase for the “wrong” reasons underscores that even if the threshold for a recession might be somewhat higher this cycle, there has nevertheless been a clear deterioration in labor market conditions.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics
Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics
The looser labor market is having the intended effect of reducing inflation pressures. Average hourly earnings increased 0.2% in July, bringing the year-over-year change down to a three-year low of 3.6%. The moderation adds to other evidence released this week that labor costs are no longer a threat to inflation, including the Employment Cost Index, the Fed’s preferred gauge of compensation costs, slipping to an annualized rate of 3.7% in Q2 and unit labor costs now running comfortably below 2%.
The July jobs report offers the latest indication that the exceptional jobs market that followed the unique circumstances of the pandemic looks to have come to an end. Demand for new workers continues to fade, as evidenced by the downward trend in job openings, small business hiring plans and temporary help employment. Workers have taken notice, with perceptions of job availability and the share of employees quitting their jobs falling to cycle lows.
The weakening trend in hiring, unemployment and job switching over the past year puts conditions on par with the late 2010s. While the labor market remains in decent shape in an absolute sense, further softening would be hard to attribute to “normalization” and instead would be consistent without outright weakness in our view.
We expect the FOMC to begin dialing back the current level of policy restriction soon. Although inflation has not yet returned to the Fed’s 2% target, the cooler jobs market points to inflation pressures continuing to recede. Our forecast remains for the FOMC to reduce the fed funds rate beginning in September by 25 bps at every other meeting through 2025, although growing risks to the employment side of the Fed’s mandate suggest a 50 bps cut in September could also be on the table as more and/or a faster pace of rate cuts look increasingly warranted.
Suddenly, bad news is actually treated as bad news by the markets. Nasdaq officially entered a correction, down 10.8% from its July 11 record high.
Right after Wednesday’s FOMC when Powell said that “downside risks to the labor market are real”, we got a series of data that seemingly proved his foresight:
- Thursday, initial unemployment claims increased by 14,000 to 249,000 in the week ended July 27 (+28% since January) while continuing claims rose by 33,000 to 1.88 million in the week ended July 20 (+8.6%).
- The same day, the widely followed ISM Manufacturing PMI declined to 46.8 in July from 48.5 with generally weak details, particularly the following observations:
Eighty-six percent of manufacturing gross domestic product (GDP) contracted in July, up from 62 percent in June. More concerning: The share of sector GDP registering a composite PMI calculation at or below 45 percent (a good barometer of overall manufacturing weakness) was 53 percent in July, 39 percentage points higher than the 14 percent reported in June. Notably, all six of the largest manufacturing industries — Machinery; Transportation Equipment; Fabricated Metal Products; Food, Beverage & Tobacco Products; Chemical Products; and Computer & Electronic Products — contracted in July.
- S&P Global’s own manufacturing PMI survey also came in weak, down 2 points to 49.6, with the also depressing comments that “new business decreased solidly, and at the fastest pace in 2024 so far. Firms reported a general slowdown in market demand (…)”.
- And Friday’s employment report confirmed that “downside risks to the labor market are real”, spooking investors to the delight of the few remaining hard-landers out there.
That bad?
Ed Yardeni blames
much of the weakness on the weather. Yes, we know, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) noted that Hurricane Beryl had no impact on the report. Yet, the BLS household employment survey showed that 1.54 million workers were either not working or only part time due to weather, far above the historical average.
Workers on temporary layoff jumped to 14.8% of total unemployment, a two-year high.
Many of these temporary layoffs showed up in the initial unemployment claims in Texas. We expect both series to revert lower in August.
Goldman Sachs estimates that
underlying trend job growth based on payroll and household employment growth remains near 150k—still in line with our estimate of the go-forward breakeven rate now that immigration is slowing. (…) more than 70% of the increase [in the unemployment rate] in July came from temporary layoffs. Whether or not they were related to Hurricane Beryl, temporary layoffs might reverse in coming months and historically have not been a good recession predictor.
Claims, a BLS seasonally adjusted series, are following a summer mini-seasonality, displaying no worsening trends on a YoY basis. Furthermore, “87% of the nsa increase in continuing claims was from Texas, which is dealing with distortions from Hurricane Beryl.”
The 0.2% jump in the unemployment rate to 4.3%, from 3.5% last year, is scaring people and triggering the Sahm Rule. But all of it is caused by labor supply rising faster than demand for workers rather than outright job losses. A surge in immigration is boosting labor availability. Goldman: “Foreign-born workers once again made an outsized contribution to the increase in the unemployment rate in July, and we now estimate that recent immigrants who came to the US in the last three years have contributed 16bp of the 59bp increase in the three-month average unemployment rate since the cycle low.”
Meanwhile, job openings are still 17% above pre-pandemic levels (+14% for private employers) and have actually stabilized since March (per JOLTS data) and increased in July (per Indeed job postings, black).
Private employment growth was a low +97k in July but the 3-month average is +146k, in line with the 2019 average of +154k. In the 6 months prior to the 2008 recession, private employment growth slid from +133k to +29k per month. In 2001, it dropped from +104k to +26k per month. In 1990: from +193k to +21k.
If Ed Yardeni is right and the weather is to blame for July’s poor jobs data, aggregate labor income (employment x hours x wages) should bounce back from its zero July MoM growth in coming months.
On a YoY basis, aggregate payrolls are still rising by nearly 5% while PCE inflation has nicely slowed to the 2.5% range.
In late 2007, inflation was accelerating, quickly eroding real purchasing power…
… dragging down growth in real expenditures from +2.0% into negative territory in 6 months.
Considering current trends in employment, wages and inflation, coupled with a rather wealthy consumer, risk of a significant slowdown in consumer spending is low. Unless the dangerously boiling situation in the Middle-East erupts and boosts oil prices to levels that would choke world economies and the American consumer whose savings rate is currently historically low. WTI prices doubled to $100 in 2007.
Corporate profits are also not suggestive of meaningful budget compressions, particularly given that unit labor costs rose only 0.5% YoY in Q2 and jumped 2.7% YoY, positive for profit margins and inflation.
EARNINGS WATCH
From LSEG IBES:
376 companies in the S&P 500 Index have reported earnings for Q2 2024. Of these companies, 78.7% reported earnings above analyst expectations and 15.7% reported earnings below analyst expectations. In a typical quarter (since 1994), 67% of companies beat estimates and 20% miss estimates. Over the past four quarters, 79% of companies beat the estimates and 16% missed estimates.
In aggregate, companies are reporting earnings that are 3.6% above estimates, which compares to a long-term (since 1994) average surprise factor of 4.2% and the average surprise factor over the prior four quarters of 7.3%.
Of these companies, 57.4% reported revenue above analyst expectations and 42.6% reported revenue below analyst expectations. In a typical quarter (since 2002), 62% of companies beat estimates and 38% miss estimates. Over the past four quarters, 62% of
companies beat the estimates and 38% missed estimates.In aggregate, companies are reporting revenues that are 0.9% above estimates, which compares to a long-term (since 2002) average surprise factor of 1.3% and the average surprise factor over the prior four quarters of 1.2%.
The estimated earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 for 24Q2 is 12.9%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate improves to 13.9%.
The estimated revenue growth rate for the S&P 500 for 24Q2 is 5.1%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate declines to 4.9%.
The estimated earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 for 24Q3 is 6.8%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate improves to 8.0%.
Trailing EPS are now $231.90. Full year 2023 EPS: $243.60e. Forward EPS: $259.51e.