The enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it’s the illusion of knowledge (Stephen Hawking)

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so (Mark Twain)

Invest with smart knowledge and objective odds

INVESTOR SENTIMENT SURVEYS: DON’T BE TOO SENTIMENTAL!

Measures of investor sentiment are popular because they are often considered reliable contrarian indicators. The evidence does not support their popularity.

Investors Intelligence

The best known is the Investors Intelligence index, created in 1963. It studies more than 100 regularly published advisory investment newsletters, assessing their stance on equity markets. The web site claims that

Since its inception in 1963, our indicator has a consistent record for predicting the major market turning points.

We don’t necessarily take a contrarian view to the newsletter writers in our survey. A large part of the time our sentiment readings remain neutral. We consider the norm to be 45% bulls, 35% bears and 20% neutral. However, we do pay attention to extreme readings in both bulls and bears and also to historically significant runs of more bulls than bears. To summarize, advisors are only wrong when you get too many of them start thinking the same thing.

I have analyzed 30 years of data plotting the II bull-bear % difference against the DJ Total Stock Market Index of 5000 US stocks. Extreme readings are above +/-25%. However, I have easily identified 11 periods when the “contrary” indicator rose to cross the extreme +30% level which were followed by strongly rising markets. Obviously not useful on that side of the ledger.

There were only 9 extreme negative readings (bullish signals) since 1980. The numerous 1981-82 readings <-25%, taken together, could be seen as indicating a major bottom, but only if you survived the 3 false signals between the fall of 1981 and the actual mid-1982 much lower low. The 1988 signal was good. The early 1990 signal was too early but the one in mid-1990 was excellent. The two signals in 1994 proved great, like the ones in late 2008.

Overall, never mind the extreme positives, they are essentially useless. The extreme negatives (bullish) are few but generally very good although some require patience and staying power.

For current readings of the II survey: Market Harmonics

AAII Sentiment Survey

Every Thursday, the American Association of Individual Investors releases the results of its Internet survey—which asks AAII members to register their bullish, bearish or neutral views on the stock market—early each Thursday. Excerpts from the WSJ:

(…) Over the past two decades, it has proved a compelling contrarian indicator: If the reading is overly bearish, for instance, it is often a sign the market will rally.

(…) the survey’s sample size is typically so small, and its methodology so fraught with holes, as to render it statistically worthless.

Just 200 to 300 investors respond each week, less than 0.2% of the association’s 150,000 dues-paying members, according to the Chicago-based group, which doesn’t publish the sample size. Among them are a large number of retirees, the AAII says—giving this tiny slice of the investing community an unusual amount of sway over Wall Street.

From a strict, statistical perspective, the AAII’s survey is “pretty much useless,” said David Madigan, professor and head of the Department of Statistics at Columbia University, who is particularly troubled by survey’s reliance on voluntary self-reporting.

“The thing you worry about is the bias of the people who volunteer. The concern is, why would someone choose to respond to this?” Prof. Madigan says. “If you were using it to make statements about how the general membership feels, then you’re on really shaky ground. But maybe the opinions of the 200 who are motivated enough to respond is predictive of what the markets are going to do.”

The real questions are: this indicator being such a “famous” contrarian signal, voters must know that their collective wisdom is read upside down. Why vote? Can anyone vote objectively?

And despite its formidable statistical limitations, the survey has been surprisingly useful as a marker of turning points, especially market bottoms. (…)

Birinyi Associates has been following the survey for years, using the difference, or spread, between the bulls and the bears as an indicator of where the market may head. Birinyi uses a four-week moving average. The results are noteworthy: On the 16 occasions since the early 1990s that bears have outnumbered bulls by at least 10%, the Standard & Poor’s 500 has gone on to rally an average 6.2% gain over the next six months.

And when optimism gets too frothy, and bulls outnumber bears by at least 30%, the S&P 500 has tended to fall over the next six months, according to Birinyi. The current run of bullishness hasn’t gone that far yet, but the numbers are quickly approaching those levels.

Interestingly, Birinyi’s criterias result in many more bearish readings (bullish signals) than bullish readings (bearish signals). It gave 6 bullish signals and only one bearish one between 1988 and 1996, missing the 1990 bear market. Between 1996 and 2002, Birinyi’s criteria gave plenty of bearish signals and only one bullish one, erased soon after. The early 2003 bullish signal was bang on but quickly morphed into a bear! Back to bull in 2005 but back again to bear before year-end. That was the last bearish signal since. Strict AAII bull/bear ratio followers have been bullish since 2006!

In all, how useful is that?

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THE “RULE OF 20” EQUITY VALUATION METHOD

In March 2009, I got involved into the raging equity valuation debate by publishing S&P 500 P/E Ratio at Troughs: A Detailed Analysis of the Past 80 Years (https://www.edgeandodds.com/smart-investing/sp-500-p-e-ratio-at-troughs-a-detailed-analysis-of-the-past-80-years/). I showed that the conventional absolute PE ratio approach widely used by the bears to recommend continued selling of equities was inadequate for the circumstances as it failed to take into account the significant decline in inflation rates (and interest rates). I explained, backed with 80 years of history, that equity valuations were then at a true historical low and that barring deflation, equities were at or near their lows and could advance 20-40% during 2009 with little downside risk. Since then, I have continued to successfully use The Rule of 20 to support my equity valuation work. This post explains why it is the superior valuation tool for the US equity market.

The Rule of 20 simply states that fair PE is 20 minus inflation with the total of PE plus inflation generally fluctuating between 15 and 25.

The chart below plots the S&P 5oo Index actual PE ratio (in red on the right axis) against the Rule of 20 ratio (in blue on the left axis). The median line is shared as 20 for The Rule of 20 and 15 for the Actual PE (PE 15) so that deviation around the median is visually similar. Arrows point to market highs and lows. The S&P 500 Index semi-log chart below is for reference.

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During the 1960’s, the PE 15 was in the overvalued area most of the decade while the Rule of 20 gave 2 buy signals (1962 for a 69% gain and 1966 for a 40% gain) that the PE 15 failed to signal. In May 1974, the PE 15 gave a strong  buy signal while the Rule of 20 gave but a feeble one that it feebly reversed in mid-1975. The PE 15 failed to give a sell signal at that time. In fact, it remained in the undervalued area between 1974 and 1985 even though the market was unchanged between December 1976 and July 1982.  The Rule of 20 gave a strong buy signal during 1977 and a sell signal in 1980, after the market had gained some 75% and just before it tanked 24%.

The Rule of 20 gave another strong buy signal in mid-1982 (remember, the PE 15 had been flashing BUY since 1974). The PE 15 reached fair value in April 1986, which the Rule of 20 only reached in March 1987 after another 24% appreciation in the S&P 500 Index. Both ratios signaled SELL during 1992 but only the Rule of 20 gave a BUY at the end of 1994 with the PE 15 then only at the fair value level. Both methods moved to overvaluation and extreme overvaluation between 1997 and 2002. The PE 15 remained in overvalued territory until August 2010 when it reached fair value.

Meanwhile, the Rule of 20 ratio reached fair value in September 2002, gave a buy signal in September 2006, started flashing overvaluation in October 2007 and gave a strong sell signal in May 2008. It went to undervaluation in November 2008 and reached what could prove to be a generation low in February 2009. The previous such low for the Rule of 20 was recorded in June 1955.

During the early 1960’s, US inflation hovered around 1.0% for nearly 7 years following violent inflation and disinflation periods after WWII. During the 1970’s through 1982, inflation fluctuated between 3% and 15%. After that and right up to 2008-09, inflation was relatively benign between 3% and 5%. It weakened rapidly in 2008-09 and remains in the 1% range since.

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It is not a coincidence that when inflation is either very low or very high that the PE 15 fails to provide equity investors with the better signals provided by The Rule of 20. The former, being merely a number (15) with “a trading range” around it (from 10 to 20) takes no account of meaningful changes in the inflationary environment, even though inflation has a direct impact on interest rates which directly (but inversely) impacts the discount rate that is the PE ratio. When inflation rises, interest rates also normally rise to maintain real rates within an appropriate range. PE ratios need to decline to reflect the increase in the earnings discount rate. Another way to look at it is that equities then face more competition for money from fixed income instruments. The cost of equities must therefore decline to keep or attract investors.

Furthermore, high inflation rates tend to reduce the quality of earnings through inventory profits for FIFO-accounting companies. If a larger percentage of earnings come from illusory and temporary inventory profits, these earnings should sell at reduced valuations.

Finally and importantly, investors know that rising inflation is generally not tolerated by central banks. An eventual rise in short term interest rates, often followed by an economic slowdown and lower profits, therefore gets factored into equity values when inflation rises.

At the other end of the spectrum, very low inflation rates (but not deflation) generally boost equity valuations. Interest rates then being generally low, investors tend to favor equities, especially when earnings are buoyant. Monetary authorities are often very accommodative in such periods, providing equity investors with an extended positive investment horizon as well as ample liquidity.

The PE 15 approach makes no adjustment for these meaningfully changing economic and monetary conditions. It leaves investors guessing what should be an appropriate multiple between 10 and 20 in spite of what could be very significant and fundamental shifts in the investing environment. The Rule of 20, while not perfect, helps investors adjust to the changing conditions as they happen. Eighty years of experience of equity markets valuation through thick and thin back the legitimacy of the Rule of 20 valuation method.