Robust underlying growth despite US GDP disappointment
US fourth quarter GDP grew at a 2.3% annualised rate, a little below the 2.6% consensus, but the details tell a more robust story that will keep the Fed wary about easing monetary policy too far too fast.
Household-related activity continues to drive the growth story with consumer spending expanding much more rapidly than expected at 4.2% annualised while residential investment jumped 5.3%. Net trade neither added nor subtracted to overall growth in the final three months of the year despite yesterday’s surprisingly large trade deficit figures for December. Meanwhile government spending increased 2.5%.
What prompted the weakness relative to expectations was primarily a big draw down of inventories that subtracted nearly a full percentage point from the headline growth rate. It may be that the surprise strength in consumer spending contributed here. Non-residential investment fell 2.2% – primarily due to a 7.8% drop in equipment, which we attribute to Boeing strikes.
Contributions to US annualised growth (%)
Source: Macrobond, ING
Consequently, the breakdown is better than the headline suggests with inventories likely to rebound next quarter and aircraft-related investment set to recover this quarter. However, net trade is probably going to be a big drag as companies look to bring forward imports to get ahead of potential tariffs while the stronger dollar will increasingly hurt export competitiveness. At least there is strong momentum in the consumer sector to provide a solid base for growth. (…)
From Interactive Brokers:
Trump’s Tariffs Hit US Growth Before, and Threaten to Again Newly released transcripts from the Federal Reserve show just how much policymakers were scrambling to keep growth intact in 2019.
For skeptics of President Donald Trump’s threatened tariffs, the concern raised most often at home is that they will boost inflation and lead to higher interest rates. The biggest lesson from his last trade war, though, may be that it’s the hit to growth that matters more. (…)
“As tariffs on other countries go up, taxes on American workers and businesses will come down and massive numbers of jobs and factories will come home,” Trump told Republican lawmakers in Miami on Monday.
But the last time he deployed them, almost the exact opposite happened. Instead, the Federal Reserve confronted a slowing economy led by a manufacturing sector shedding rather than gaining jobs, data and new transcripts of policymakers’ discussions at the height of Trump’s first trade war show. (…)
In 2019, the first full year after Trump began imposing the levies — which were much more carefully targeted versus the broad ones he’s threatening now — the US lost 43,000 factory jobs, industrial production contracted, business investment stalled and real median household incomes fell for the first time in five years. By one estimate, the hit to consumer earnings was $8 billion.
Subsequent studies have shown Trump’s tariffs played a role in all of that. Their drag on growth — caused via higher import costs, retaliation from other countries, and a broader uncertainty over US trade policy — was soon overshadowed by the much bigger shock of the Covid pandemic.
In the moment, Fed officials were already concerned about what was playing out, according to transcripts released this month of the 2019 meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee — the panel that sets interest rates. The verbatim accounts of closed-door meetings are released with a five-year lag. (…)
Fed economists in 2019 calculated that the new import taxes Trump started to impose on aluminum, steel, and select goods from China the year before — and retaliation by other countries — resulted in a net loss of US factory jobs and higher producer prices.
In a later study, economists at the New York Fed and Columbia University found that tariffs caused an $8.2 billion reduction in real income in 2018, and led American consumers and importers to pay $14 billion to the government. “Our estimates are likely to be a conservative measure of the losses,” they wrote.
What happened in 2019 matters because it was the first time policymakers dealt with the economic impact of a broad swath of higher import taxes since the 1930s. It was a rare real-world experiment in the effects of protectionism.
It’s also meaningful because Trump is threatening an even larger deployment of tariffs this time around with far greater potential for economic disruption, which Fed officials were thinking about before he even took office. (…)
“We worry that the lesson of 2019 — when tariffs unsettled the equity market and contributed to the FOMC delivering ‘insurance cuts’ — is being ignored,” Goldman Sachs Group Inc. economists said in a recent note. (…)
In 2019, joblessness fell lower than many economists believed it could go, and inflation stayed below the Fed’s 2% goal, a fact that perplexed policymakers.
But the absence of inflation concerns allowed the Fed to respond to Trump’s tariffs. After raising rates to 2.5% in 2018, Fed officials held them there in the first half of 2019 before starting cuts in July.
“Ultimately, the risk of a slowing in the economy and a tick up in unemployment outweighed the risk of easing too much and creating excesses,” then-Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan said in a recent interview. “That’s what won out.”
Former Chicago Fed President Charles Evans recalls what was almost a recession in manufacturing unfolding. “You could see it slowing down a part of the economy after taxes had been cut,” he said in an interview last week. “That was very surprising, I thought.”
Today, the picture is almost flipped. The US is coming off two years of strong growth and the highest inflation in 40 years. While the Fed’s tightening in 2022 and 2023 helped cool price growth, it still hasn’t reached officials’ 2% target.
That’s left the Fed hesitant to cut rates further after lowering them by a percentage point at the end of 2024. Policymakers held rates steady at their meeting concluding Wednesday, and Powell has made clear any further reductions depend on inflation continuing to fall — or a marked deterioration in the labor market.
Strategist Who Coined the Magnificent Seven Warns US Tech Is Set to Lag Sees risks from overexposure to US stocks as AI spending peaks
(…) Those positions are at risk as spending on artificial intelligence is set to peak, Hartnett wrote in a note. He also sees other catalysts of a US outperformance including excess fiscal support and immigration fading this year.
“US exceptionalism now exceptionally expensive, exceptionally well-owned,” the strategist wrote. “‘Magnificent 7’ becomes ‘Lagnificent 7,’ supports broadening of US and global equity and credit markets.” (…)
2023/24 was the narrowest stock market since 1998/99’s technology bubble, which in turn was the narrowest market since the Nifty 50 period
of the early 1970s. With only three such periods in the past 50 years, narrow markets are the exception and not the rule.Chart 1 shows how unusual 2023/24’s market has been. Just 30% of the constituents of the S&P 500® outperformed the index in 2023 and slightly less in 2024. That is similar to the 1998/99 period, and both are well below the long-term median of 48%. (…)
Extremely narrow leadership implies a scarcity of growth opportunities, i.e., there are very few companies that can grow. An extended period of narrow leadership, therefore, implies a terrible secular period during which the economy experiences an extended contraction/recession and the resulting scarcity of earnings growth forces companies to lay off workers and decrease capital spending. (…)
Unlike during the Great Depression, fundamentals haven’t justified today’s extraordinarily narrow leadership. 2023/24’s economy was healthy and late 2022/early 2023’s profits recession was quite mild compared to that during a depression.
If the recent market narrowness assumes that competition and innovation no longer matter, it may only be a matter of time before they broaden. When markets broaden from unusually narrow periods, however, they do so suddenly and for years.
The Goldman analysis also highlights that market volatility tends to significantly increase during the year after extremely narrow markets. Diversification typically constrains portfolio volatility, but narrow markets skew indices’ constituent weightings toward fewer companies effectively making an index less diversified. Increased concentration towards a small number of cyclical companies makes the overall market more susceptible to company-specific risks.
Because narrow markets are the exception and not the rule, history shows that markets broaden for years after periods of extremely narrow market leadership. Investors, however, tend to wait for the abnormally narrow leadership to reassert itself rather than repositioning portfolios for a more normal market.
This was certainly the case after 1998/1999’s narrow markets. Chart 2 shows S&P 500® sector performance during the final year of the Technology Bubble (3/31/99 – 3/31/00). Only 1 sector, Technology, outperformed the market during this period. (…)
The Technology sector quickly started to underperform and didn’t recover even after 5 years.
Diversification was critical to surviving the post-bubble period. Although the narrow leadership dragged down the overall market performance, many sectors posted significant positive returns.
Investors seem unduly confident despite the increased potential for volatility after narrow markets. Diversification today is considered a hinderance to performance by many investors rather than a risk reduction tool or one that might shift portfolios toward under-appreciated investments.
Chart 7 highlights the question in the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey that asks whether respondents think the stock market will be higher in 12 months. The past two months’ readings show a level of confidence in the stock market never seen in the survey’s history.
Investors’ willingness to take risk is even more startling. Chart 8 shows individual investors’ aggregate portfolio equity beta. Admittedly, we have re-published this chart from BofA Securities for many months. We thought it was extraordinary when their equity beta rose to 1.2, but it has continued to increase as the market continued to narrow. It is now an absolutely mind-boggling 1.7!
The juxtaposition of investors’ historic confidence relative to the performance history when markets broaden from extremes suggests that investors might be ill-prepared for volatility.
It appears that 2025 could be the year when investors’ extreme confidence and willingness to take significant portfolio risk comes face-to-face with the volatility associated with the broadening of a speculative market.
Diversification is one of the basic tenets of investing, but investors’ greed during speculative periods leads them to shun diversification because it looks stodgy, boring, and a lead weight on the potential for high returns. Themes regarding “The Magnificent 7”, “US exceptionalism”, and others reflect the current shunning of diversification. (…)
Today’s narrowness is even more dangerous than previous ones given the rising share of passive investments. A high beta works both ways…
(Apollo Management)
Goldman Sachs:
The equity markets’ correction, triggered by news of the DeepSeek LLM model, has been the first fall of more than 3.5% of the Magnificent 7 since last Autumn. In our view this is a correction and not the start of a sustained bear market.
Most bear markets are triggered by expectations of falling profits driven by fears of recession. Our economists remain confident about world growth and remain above consensus on their forecasts for the US, putting the probability of recession in the next 12 months at 15%.
We also expect interest rates to be cut, albeit modestly this year, alongside more progress on inflation moderation – and a cheaper entrant into the AI space might increase confidence in this trend. This combination of macro conditions has historically been supportive of risk assets.
Nevertheless, we have argued that context is important and that equity markets came into the year priced for perfection, leaving them vulnerable to disappointments. Returns in equity markets, led by the US, have been unusually strong over the past couple of years, and particularly since October 2023 as investors began to become more optimistic about the prospects for lower inflation and interest rates alongside a soft landing.
Overall levels of valuation had reached very high levels, particularly in the US, and P/E multiples have increased meaningfully since Q4 2023. In the case of the US, while much of this reflects the largest technology companies, the equity market remains expensive relative to history even if we exclude large cap technology (the second column). Furthermore, while other equity markets around the world are much cheaper than the US, most are not particularly cheap relative to their own history. The main exception is China.
While surging equity returns coupled with high valuation provide fertile conditions for a correction, it is also the concentration of equities as an asset class that has left equity investors vulnerable to disappointments. The rising concentration in equities has taken three forms: the growing dominance of the US equity market in the global index, the ascent of the technology sector, and the rise in single stock concentration (particularly in the US).
To be clear, these factors have emerged as a function of strong fundamentals, not as the result of speculation or irrational exuberance. The growing dominance of the US equity market has simply mirrored its relative profit growth since the financial crisis.
Meanwhile, the growing influence of technology on market returns reflects the significant outpacing of technology profits relative to other industries over the same period.
Furthermore, the dominance of the biggest companies in the US equity market is a function of their vastly superior earnings power over the past decade.
The dominance of US equity market, technology sector, and dominant companies does not represent a bubble based on irrational exuberance but is rather a reflection of superior fundamentals. Nevertheless, while stronger growth has justified the patterns of returns that have driven equity markets over the recent past, they do not tell us about the future expectations or returns.
On a forward-looking basis, while the US equity market is likely to move higher based on solid earnings growth, its superior earnings growth at the index level is set to fade, opening up opportunities for more diversification. For this year at the index level our top-down forecasts are similar across all regions (except for Europe), suggesting more opportunity for geographic diversification.
At the same time, our US strategists expect the strong pace of earnings growth of the dominant technology companies to continue but also to moderate on a relative basis.
The dominant companies are still expected to see superior growth but the gap is narrowing. We have argued that this leaves a risk in such a concentrated market. The price action of the GRANOLAS in Europe last year, provides a good use-case for the risk of high concentration in the US with the Magnificent 7. Despite their earnings continuing to grow faster than the rest of the European market, the GRANOLAS valuations have significantly declined, resulting in flat year-over-year performance. This derating has negatively impacted the overall market due to the size of these companies. (…)
History provides some useful lessons. First, the original capex spenders on revolutionary technology are not always the biggest beneficiaries; the experience of the Telecom companies in the late 1990s is a good example. Second, even very dominant companies eventually succumb to competition – often from new companies in the same sector – just as AMD and Intel experienced, for example, with the ascent of Nvidia.
The extent to which these observations are relevant to the current market setup is still not clear. But the news around DeepSeek has been a wake up call that has shaken the confidence that was reflected in market pricing. Indeed, our technology analysts argue “DeepSeek has introduced pricing competition into the foundational model layer at a point in time where models are just about good enough for many enterprise use cases”. The revelation of a cheaper competitor entering the AI space has exposed the risk of concentration. This is relevant because equity markets are not typically driven by absolute outcomes, but rather by outcomes relative to expectations.
We noted last week that the polling responses to questions asked at our annual Global Strategy Conferences revealed a very strong consensus that the patterns of leadership that drove the returns over the past couple of years is set to continue, leaving room for disappointment. For example, at our London conference, 58% of the votes – the highest ever – were for the US equity market to be the best performer in 2025.
This marks an increase from 32% last year and 18% the year before. Meanwhile, Europe remains the least preferred, receiving only 8% of the votes compared to 13% last year. We find similar examples of US exceptionalism as a driver of outperformance in the responses at our Asia Strategy conference where a record low 3% believed Europe would outperform.
There was a similar degree of confidence in the ongoing dominance of the technology sector as the likely winner this year. (…)
While the macro set up for equities remains supportive, we have been recommending that investors stay invested but diversify to improve risk adjusted returns.
The line to watch on this chart id the yellow Rule of 20 Fair Value line which is EPS x 20 minus inflation. Profits are still rising faster than inflation.