Today:
- FOMC minutes.
- A key Treasury auction.
- Earnings: Nvidia, Target, Lowe’s, and TJX.
AI’s Macroeconomic Challenges and Promises
From the NY Fed:
In the third quarter of 2025, America’s largest tech firms for the first time spent more on capital investment than they earned from operations. The implication is that AI, a technology with the potential to make the economy more productive, is, for now, absorbing resources faster than it is generating returns. This post discusses how the tension between AI’s long-run promise and its short-run costs affects the outlooks for inflation, real activity, and financial stability. (…)
A widely held view is that AI, by raising productivity, will be a powerful disinflationary force. This view may ultimately prove correct, but it skips a crucial step. What matters for inflation is not whether AI raises productivity, but whether it raises productivity faster than it increases the costs of adopting it.
During the transition, firms divert substantial resources toward reorganization, data infrastructure, and integration, which can temporarily raise production costs even as the technological frontier expands. This is the so-called “productivity J-curve,” depicted in the figure below. (…)
Measured Productivity Can Fall During the Adoption Phase
Recent data suggest that AI-driven demand has been pushing prices up over the past two years, and those costs are now passing through to prices of consumer electronics. For example, the prices for memory chips are up substantially. A recent report indicates that energy consumption and prices are also being affected.
AI may shift the economy’s fundamentals: the level of potential output and the natural rate of interest. The critical question is whether AI generates a one-time level shift in productive capacity or a sustained acceleration in growth (see figure below). A level shift temporarily raises the natural interest rate during the transition before growth reverts to baseline, while a growth acceleration raises it permanently.
Faster AI Adoption Can Signal Either That the Economy Is Overheating or That It’s Catching Up to Its AI-Lifted Potential
To date, estimates of the productivity impact span both scenarios, from modest gains of a few percentage points of GDP over a decade to considerably larger effects if AI augments the innovation process itself. The range is wide and the uncertainty is compounded by countervailing forces, including a possible increase in market concentration and shifts in household saving and spending.
Concentration matters because AI adoption tends to be skewed toward large firms: if rents accrue to a handful of incumbents, the investment boom that lifts the neutral rate may prove narrower than aggregate figures suggest, and winner-take-all dynamics may also slow the diversity of research that sustains long-run growth.
On the household side, the fall in consumption among workers whose tasks AI displaces may be only partially offset by the gains of those it complements. If the latter tend to save a higher share of their earnings, aggregate consumption may be weaker than productivity figures alone would suggest.
Until recently, the major AI companies funded capital investment almost entirely from retained earnings, insulating the AI buildout from credit-market conditions.
That changed in late 2025: capital expenditures began to exceed operating cash flows, and the firms raised over $100 billion of new debt. Beneath those headline bond issues lies a more intricate layer—off-balance-sheet project finance vehicles funding data center construction, securitizations backed by lease cash flows, and hundreds of billions in forward lease commitments that will not appear on balance sheets for years.
Much of this debt is predicated on AI productivity returns that have not yet materialized. If expectations shift, the correction could travel quickly and widely: the same institutions—insurers, asset managers, pension funds—hold overlapping exposures across corporate bonds, securitizations, and private placements, so a broad repricing would hit them from multiple directions at once. (…)
The IT revolution of the 1900s offers a cautionary precedent. In the 1990s, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan resisted calls to tighten prematurely, betting that IT was expanding the economy’s productive capacity. He was right. But the dot-com crash that followed showed that even when the supply-side narrative is broadly correct, expectations can generate asset-price dynamics that create independent financial stability risks. Getting the trend right did not protect against the bubble.
Today’s AI cycle features some of the same tensions as that episode—uncertain productivity effects, difficulty distinguishing supply from demand, and expectations-driven asset dynamics. But it is unfolding within a layered and leveraged financial system. As a result, the path toward an AI-driven high-productivity economy might prove to be a bumpy one.
Canada: Inflation climbs again in April, but the Bank of Canada can afford to wait
Inflation edged higher again in April, as the annual increase in prices climbed from 2.4% in March to 2.8%. However, the increase was well below economists’ consensus forecast of 3.1%.
As in March, the month-over-month increase in consumer prices was largely driven by higher energy prices amid the conflict in the Middle East. Part of the monthly increase in gasoline prices was offset by the temporary suspension of the federal fuel excise tax introduced mid-April, but energy prices still surged 19% annually, as the April 2025 removal of the carbon tax was pushed out of the year-over-year calculations.
Excluding energy, CPI fell from 2.3% in March to 1.8% in April. Meanwhile, food inflation, which is another closely watched category amid ongoing global supply chain disruptions, rose by just 0.05% month over month, a sharp slowdown from the 0.40% increase recorded in March. That said, food prices could still feel the delayed effects of the ongoing Middle East crisis, meaning it would be premature to conclude that inflationary pressures in this category have fully subsided.
Excluding food and energy, prices were also surprisingly low, as they remained unchanged monthly, resulting in only a 0.3% gain on a three-month annualized basis.
As for the measures favored by the Central Bank, they rose at a slightly faster pace—though not to an alarming extent—to 0.18% for the CPI-Median and 0.14% for the CPI-Trim. On an annualized three-month basis, they are growing at rates that are comfortable for the Central Bank, at 2.2% and 1.5%, respectively.
Since inflation in Canada was already well under control before the recent oil shock, we have argued that the Bank of Canada should look through the rise in energy prices and leave interest rates unchanged. This morning’s report reinforces that view.
Core inflation remains contained, pointing to an economy still operating with excess supply. It also reflects the continued easing in shelter costs. Indeed, a declining population combined with higher interest rates has triggered a correction in housing prices, particularly in the country’s least affordable markets. With vacancy rates increasing amid recent demographic trends, rent prices have been the biggest driver of this slowdown.
In this context, and given that the labour market registered its worst start of the year since 2009 (excluding the pandemic), we believe that the risk of second-round effects (wage-push inflation) from the surge in energy prices is limited.
True, the conflict is still not resolved, and energy prices are on track to rise again in May, meaning that annual inflation has likely not peaked yet. But interest rates already appear far from accommodative in an environment characterized by geopolitical uncertainty and ongoing trade tensions with Washington. Overall, current conditions argue for a patient approach from the Bank of Canada.
- April Headline CPI YoY: Canada +2.8%, USA +3.8%
- April Core CPI: Canada +1.5%, USA +2.7%
Same Shock, Different Roads? A K‑Shaped Pattern at the Pump
(…) with the sharp increases in gasoline prices in March, a K-shaped pattern in gasoline consumption emerged—showing faster consumption growth for high-income households relative to low-income households. These gasoline consumption patterns qualitatively match those following the increase in energy prices at the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in spring 2022, even though the gap in consumption trends during the current episode is quantitatively larger. (…)
The left panel of the chart below shows nominal gasoline spending rose by over 15 percent in Numerator in March 2026, going from being 10 percent below the 2023 level to being 5.5 percent above. This increase was driven by the rising price of gasoline as real gasoline consumption fell 3 percent (right panel). MARTS recorded a similar increase in gasoline station spending for March 2026 (14.5 percent). (…)
Low-income households increased their nominal gas spending by the least (12 percent). However, this was accomplished because they cut their real gas consumption the most (7 percent). On the other hand, high-income households increased their nominal gas spending by the most (19 percent) in a large part because they reduced their real gas consumption the least (1 percent). Middle-income households had intermediate increases in nominal spending and decreases in real consumption at gas stations.
Thus, the K-shaped consumption pattern in both nominal and real gasoline spending was strongly evident in March 2026. (…)
With the current energy price shock, a K-shaped pattern in gasoline consumption has opened up much more than before. Higher-income households have reduced real gas consumption only modestly and increased gasoline spending considerably compared with 2023. In contrast, lower-income households increased spending by much less and decreased real consumption by much more, potentially by carpooling or substituting to public transit where available.
(…) The oil price shock has quickly filtered through to households. Filling up has become noticeably more expensive across the eurozone, albeit to very different degrees. Compared with the week before the joint US‑Israeli strike on Iran, the price of a 50-litre tank of unleaded petrol has risen by an average of between €5.00 in Spain and €13.50 in Germany. For diesel, the average increase has been even steeper, ranging from €15.65 in Italy to €23.00 in the Netherlands.
The biggest differences across eurozone countries were seen in late March and early April, coinciding with the spike in oil prices. Some of these gaps have since narrowed, partly due to temporary fiscal measures in several eurozone countries.
If fuel prices were to remain at current levels for the rest of the year, annual fuel expenses would rise by roughly €70 in Italy and up to €280 for petrol in the Netherlands compared to last year. For diesel, the additional burden would range from €190 to €430. And for those still remembering the 2022 energy price shock: annual fuel expenses (in nominal terms) in the eurozone would be between 2% (Austria) and 15% (the Netherlands) higher than in 2022.
While this increase in fuel prices alone could undermine private consumption, it will do so more unevenly than many might think.
Across the eurozone, the share of disposable income spent on fuel differs markedly. Last year, households in Italy spent around 4.0% of their disposable income on fuel, compared with 6.2% in Portugal. Interestingly, this gap does not reflect cheaper fuel in Italy. On the contrary, with higher taxes, fuel prices there are at the higher end of the scale in the eurozone. The gap instead points to differences in driving habits, with Italians driving relatively few kilometres per year, and lower income levels in Portugal limiting the ability to absorb higher costs.
The increase in fuel prices so far, excluding any additional fiscal measures, is likely to widen the difference between eurozone countries in the share of disposable income spent on fuel. In the Netherlands, the sharpest absolute rise in fuel costs is pushing households to spend a much larger share of their disposable income on fuel than a year ago. Germany, France, and Austria, where people tend to drive more, are likely to face greater additional financial burdens as well, while Italy and Spain should see a more moderate increase. In Spain, the temporary reduction in the VAT rate on fuel from 21% to 10% dampens the price effect. In Italy, the below-average mileage is providing some relief.
Share of annual disposable income per capita spent on fuel
(…) higher prices at the pump are more likely to hit consumption elsewhere than behaviour. As a result, higher fuel costs are likely to increasingly crowd out discretionary spending. (…)
According to the latest European Commission survey, willingness to spend has dropped sharply in Germany and Austria – countries where disposable income is set to be among the hardest hit by rising fuel costs. Here, willingness to spend is also well below the long-term average.
Italy and Spain have also seen a decline, but spending intentions remain above their long-term averages. In France and Portugal, consumer appetite has so far held up relatively well – possibly because households there are already used to allocating a larger share of income to fuel.
Higher fuel prices are not only an energy story in the eurozone. They are quickly turning into a consumption story, and an increasingly asymmetric one. As households across the eurozone are forced to spend more at the pump, cutting down on other discretionary spending will diverge sharply across countries.
China, U.S. Reach Limited Trade Agreements on Boeing Jets, Beef Imports China’s commerce ministry said it hopes the U.S. will further eliminate unilateral tariffs in future trade talks
China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing jets and resume imports of some U.S. beef products, marking one of the clearest signs yet of easing trade tensions following last week’s summit between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
China’s Commerce Ministry said trade teams from the two countries held in-depth discussions on tariffs last week and made arrangements regarding bilateral tariffs measures, according to an official statement released Wednesday.
The ministry said it hopes the U.S. will honor its commitments and ensure tariff levels on Chinese goods do not exceed those agreed at the October meeting in Kuala Lumpur. It also said it hopes the U.S. will further eliminate unilateral tariffs on China in future trade talks.
Both countries agreed in principle to discuss a framework for reciprocal tariff reductions on products of equivalent value under a trade council mechanism, with each side covering goods worth at least US$30 billion.
According to the ministry, products agreed upon by both sides could eventually be subject to most-favored-nation tariff rates or lower.
If the two countries cut tariffs on roughly $30 billion worth of products, it would cover about 10% of U.S. imports from China, said Zhiwei Zhang, economist at Pinpoint Asset Management. That wouldn’t be significant enough to change the market’s China growth forecast, but it’s is a positive step in the right direction, Zhang said.
“As long as the two countries are talking to stabilize the bilateral relations, it is good news for global investors.” Zhang said. (…)
On rare earths, the ministry said trade teams from both countries had extensive discussions on export-control issues and would jointly study and address each other’s legitimate concerns. It reiterated that the Chinese government imposes export controls on key minerals such as rare earths in accordance with laws and regulations, and reviews compliant, civilian-use export permit applications.
Bloomberg explains:
The ministry’s comments are a reason for cautious optimism that the one-year cessation in trade hostilities clinched by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump will remain in place.
The ministry’s statement signals Beijing would accept US tariffs provided they do not exceed the level agreed in Malaysia that brought the effective rate to about 30%. That was later reduced to an estimated 21% after some tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court.
The Trump administration has sought new Section 301 investigations to return levies to the level before the court ruling. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said those tariffs may be restored by July.
The ministry also said the US should further remove unilateral tariffs upon follow-up talks to “create favorable conditions for expanding economic and trade cooperation.”
Xi welcomed Putin on Tiananmen Square at the start of their summit, giving him the same treatment received days earlier by Trump. A 21-gun salute rang out as a military band played their two national anthems, while dozens of children holding Russian and Chinese flags greeted them and shouted, “Welcome, welcome.” (…)
Calling Xi a “dear friend,” Putin said Russia remains a reliable supplier of energy to China. “In the current tense situation on the international stage, our close cooperation is especially needed,” he said.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin praised the strength of their relationship during talks in Beijing as both countries seek to reinforce bilateral ties in the shadow of wars in Ukraine and Iran.
The two leaders signed a pact on deepening strategic cooperation on Wednesday before looking on as officials from both nations inked a series of other documents on topics ranging from trade and technology to railway construction. Putin said approximately 40 agreements had been reached during the visit, even as they didn’t mention a key gas pipeline project. (…)
Topics on the agenda at the talks between Russia and China included the planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, the Kremlin said earlier, though neither leader mentioned the project in remarks while signing agreements. (…)
The Chinese president said earlier that both sides are working on deepening political trust and strategic coordination. (…)
“A comprehensive ceasefire is imperative, restarting war is even more unacceptable, and adhering to negotiations is particularly important,” Xi said in Beijing.
Yesterday:
(…) “I hope we don’t have to do the war, but we may have to give them another big hit,” Trump told reporters on Tuesday. When asked how long he would wait, he said: “Well, I mean, I’m saying two or three days, maybe Friday, Saturday, Sunday. Something maybe early next week — a limited period of time.” (…)
The FT adds:
Xi told Putin that the crisis in the Gulf was at a “critical juncture” and reiterated calls to end the fighting and stabilise energy supplies and trade, according to comments published by Chinese state news agency Xinhua.
“Unilateralism and hegemonism are deeply harmful, and the world faces the danger of regressing back to the law of the jungle,” Xi said in a veiled criticism of the US.
More practically, the FT’s Martin Wolf reminds us:
First came the war. Then came the blockade. Now come the shortages. The tankers full of essential commodities — oil, liquid natural gas, urea, refined oil products, hydrogen, helium and so forth — have not sailed through the Strait of Hormuz since the end of February. Those that left before the closure have mostly arrived. From now on, the shipments that did not leave will increasingly be missed.
As inventories are also drawn down, we will move into an era of physical shortages.
Up to now, shortages have been mostly imaginary. Now they will become real. They must be managed, ultimately by suppressing demand. The latter in turn will require some combination of rationing and recession. A blend of higher prices with tighter monetary policy could deliver both. The longer the strait remains closed and the bigger the physical damage, the longer shortages will remain and the worse their impact.
(…) the main shortages now are in jet fuel and diesel. Given these product-specific realities, the US is not self-sufficient in oil. (…)
Finally, the shortages are far from limited to energy. Also affected are supplies of helium, naphtha, methanol, phosphates, urea, ammonia and sulphur. The reduction in supply of helium damages production of microchips. The reduction in supply of commodities essential to making artificial fertilisers will reduce global food production. There is also a negative impact on world shipping, since the longer routes are more expensive. (…)
The US called its war “Operation Epic Fury”. But “Operation Epic Folly” would have been a more realistic name.
Martin should have expanded on how shortages of sulphur would be critically harmful:
The primary industrial use of sulfur is the production of sulfuric acid, the world’s most widely used industrial chemical.
- It is primarily used to dissolve phosphate rock to produce soluble phosphate fertilizers. Sulfur itself is also a vital plant nutrient required for crop protein synthesis. Fertilizer plants face immediate raw material deficits. This causes global price spikes for key agricultural inputs like urea and phosphate. Without accessible sulfur-based fertilizers, farmers worldwide are forced to scale back usage.
- Sulfuric acid is the primary agent used in ore leaching to extract and purify critical minerals like copper, nickel, cobalt, and lithium. Production of high-performance Lithium-ion batteries depends on cobalt, lithium, and High-Pressure Acid Leaching (HPAL) of nickel. A sulfur crunch could stall electric vehicle supply chains. Roughly 20% of the world’s copper supply relies on sulfur-dependent extraction. Shortages instantly inflate processing costs, threatening the rollout of electrical grids and renewable energy infrastructure.
- It serves as a vital component in semiconductor chip manufacturing (used for cleaning and cooling chips), the production of lead-acid batteries, rubber vulcanization (tires), and the synthesis of pharmaceuticals. A supply deficit slows down microprocessor fabrication lines. This ripple effect limits the manufacturing capacity for everyday essentials, ranging from smartphones and medical devices to automotive computer systems.
The issue is not price, it’s the physical availability.
The European Commission said it would assess “preparedness options for key fertilisers”, including requiring member states to have seasonal or minimum stocks, and potentially putting in place joint procurement of fertilisers and their components.
The measure is one of several moves by the Commission to tackle the high prices of crop nutrients and secure supplies, in a package unveiled on Tuesday.
Presenting the plan, commissioner for agriculture Christophe Hansen said: “Food security starts with fertiliser security. Europe must produce more and depend less on others for the nutrients that sustain our agriculture.”
Before the war, as much as a third of globally traded fertilisers transited through the Strait of Hormuz, leaving food supply chains exposed to disruption from the US-Israeli war against Iran.
Nitrogen-based fertiliser prices last month were approximately 70 per cent above their 2024 average. Gas accounts for as much as 80 per cent of their costs. (…)
The proposal comes amid a broader shift towards strategic stockpiling of food and agricultural inputs, as governments increasingly treat supply chains as a national security issue after successive shocks from the pandemic, the Ukraine war and Middle East tensions exposed vulnerabilities in global trade. (…)
Hoarding is going broad and global.
Samsung Faces Chip Plant Strike That Threatens Global Supply
Talks between Samsung Electronics Co. and its largest labor union broke down, raising the prospect of a strike that may disrupt global chip supply and hamper an important engine of Korean economic growth.
A general work stoppage will go ahead on Thursday after Samsung’s management rejected a proposal from government mediators that had been accepted by the union, labor leader Choi Seung-ho told reporters. Hours later, South Korean labor minister Kim Young-hoon called for direct negotiations between the two sides, though it’s unclear whether even that intervention could resolve their differences. (…)
The collapse in negotiations puts the global technology supply chain at risk because Samsung is the world’s biggest supplier of the chips that go into devices from data center servers to smartphones and electric vehicles. The global AI infrastructure rollout has enriched South Korean companies on a scale not seen before, putting Samsung on track to become one of the world’s most profitable firms this year. Its semiconductor arm posted a 48-fold jump in profit for the March quarter.
More Koreans are demanding a greater share of those earnings after SK Hynix Inc. agreed last year to allocate 10% of annual operating profit to a performance bonus pool. Samsung’s lingering labor dispute, which puts the company at risk of production delays and complications accelerating development of its next-generation semiconductors, is being closely watched by other firms. On Wednesday, a union at Korean internet company Kakao Corp. said some of its members agreed to strike following failed wage negotiations, Yonhap reported. (…)
The union wants Samsung to scrap an existing bonus cap, allocate 15% of its operating profit to worker bonuses and formalize those terms in employment contracts.
Samsung had proposed allocating 10% of operating profit to bonuses, along with a one-time special compensation package that exceeds industry standards. Samsung executives argued that the union’s demands would be difficult to sustain over the long term. (…)
The government has previously hinted that it could resort to rarely used emergency powers to prevent a strike if the parties fail to reach an agreement. South Korea has invoked the emergency arbitration mechanism only four times since 1969. The last time was in 2005, when Korean Air pilots went on strike.
The Bank of Korea forecast that the strike could lead to as big as a 0.5 percentage point cut in Korea’s GDP growth this year, local media reported. (…)

