“The Little Excursion”
With Close Calls on U.S. Warships, Iran Shows New Appetite for Escalation Tehran’s forces are taking aim at the U.S. Navy in a way they haven’t done since the start of the war
- Trump’s Top Advisers Confront Possibility That Iran War Lasts Through End of Term The president still says he expects the war will end ‘immediately’ after midterm elections this fall
(…) “because they can’t hold out any longer.” (…)
The Pentagon has planned to extend the deployment of some air-defense units in the Middle East with no firm end date, according to people familiar with the matter. The units, part of some 50,000 troops deployed to the region, are spread across the Gulf to shoot down missiles and drones.
A third Marine Expeditionary Unit is preparing to deploy to the region this fall, a U.S. official said, signaling a continuing rotation of the amphibious units that operate from a group of warships. (…)
Analysts say it makes sense that the Trump administration might be settling in for a lengthy fight.
“The U.S. naval blockade is unlikely to produce a decisive outcome in the near or even medium term, so the only realistic use of this tool would have to be predicated on plans for a long-term siege,” said Suzanne Maloney, an Iran expert and vice president for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington.
“Even then its prospects for success are dubious, mainly because of the unintended consequences,” she added, such as attacks on energy and economic targets in the Gulf states. (…)
“Everyone pays, but neither leadership is yet paying enough to accept the other side’s terms.”
David’s analysis:
A protracted war enters a wider, less controlled phase. The current phase of instability is marked by geographic expansion of the theater around the two key maritime chokepoints — Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb — the employment of improved technology on both sides, and a more chaotic exchange of blows. The Houthi offensive on the Red Sea side is fundamentally about control of their own strait and the standing threat it poses to the Saudi Red Sea route.
Real power in Iran has shifted to the IRGC, a drift of years that became an abrupt lurch with the death of Khamenei. Mojtaba Khamenei, elected Supreme Leader days after his father’s killing, has not appeared in public in six months; his decrees reorder the military command while the war is run from elsewhere.
In Samuel Finer’s terms, the Islamic Republic is moving from a palace-church polity toward a praetorian state: the institutional forms remain, but the Guard is now the decisive power, and the evidence is written into domestic policy. Implementation of the harsher 2024 veiling law was suspended by the SNSC itself, and the state tolerated open defiance of religious norms throughout the war — the security organ overriding the clerical-moral one.
The main counterweight is not theocratic but republican: the forum represented by Ghalibaf, Araghchi and Pezeshkian, who speak for the public and the war’s economic toll. Ghalibaf is himself ex-IRGC, but as negotiator he has called the memorandum a “true victory” and pressed de-escalation in Baghdad and Doha — the forum speaking, not the barracks.
Iran’s strongest legal case — temporary, reversible restrictions on transit through its own territorial waters under a self-defense justification — was overshot long ago, when Tehran declared the entire strait closed except to traffic using its designated channel, citing war. The new exclusion zone, extending from the line of the American blockade toward the strait and into the Gulf of Oman, pushes the claim well beyond any defensible limit and does not bode well for the adapted traffic pattern that had emerged.
Iran gave diplomacy a chance, and diplomacy, like war, has its risks: Tehran scored real victories, but the Oman deal remains on the table. The expanded zone is best read as an attempt to dislodge the holding, staging and transfer activity that has dominated the Gulf of Oman since April and anchored the limited success of the southern corridor.
It also places American warships directly in the crosshairs. The exclusion zone is offensive in character — an assertion of control rather than a reprisal — and together with the strikes on Al-Azraq (Jordan), it marks a break from the exchange-cycle pattern of the earlier war.
The American decision to sink rather than board or disable tankers on the Iran–China route is a significant escalation in its own right, and Washington is fielding more unmanned surface vessels while Iran deploys new missile technology.
The other war:
Bessent Dares Bond Traders to Burn Down the House
It’s not the best idea to goad markets into betting against you. (…)
After that buildup, Wednesday’s announcement that buybacks were being tripled wasn’t enough. The market responded with disappointment that he hadn’t used even more shock and awe, and pushed up the 10-year Treasury yield to 4.84%, its highest in three years. Bessent has revealed that he’s prepared to intervene, and it was predictable that the market would respond by testing just how far he’d go.
It will be interesting to see what Bessent does next, but the day’s hectic events also highlight another conundrum. Bond yields have been rising steadily without tipping over the stock market. Even Wednesday, the S&P 500 clawed back much of its fall. Could there be a tipping point ahead at which higher yields finally bring down stocks, and could yields hit 5% for the 10-year Treasury? (…)
The key reason investors feel able to look through rising bond yields is, inevitably, the AI buildout. That is seen as an external factor that counteracts the strong macroeconomic headwinds. To quote Freya Beamish and Davide Oneglia of TS Lombard:
When tech companies are chasing the notion of infinite demand, it is quite hard to slow them down with a few basis points, particularly as the process of leveraging up has only just begun in big tech, though there are some clear front-runners. While the financing loop works, it is self-reinforcing.
Spectacular earnings growth has so far more than counterbalanced the tighter multiples that have come with the shift in the bond market. And investors seem convinced that it can continue. The latest survey of global asset allocators by Absolute Strategy Research finds comfortable majorities believing both that yields will continue to rise and that the stock market will be higher a year from now.
Earnings growth is seen as making stocks immune to a rising cost of money, although Absolute Strategy’s David Bowers cautions that “some investors are viewing this corporate earnings/margins story in isolation” and underestimating the effects that AI investment could have in raising interest rates and inflation.
If any stock market is particularly at risk from rising bond yields, it is the US. That’s because a huge chunk of American companies’ value is tied up in future earnings. These will be automatically rendered cheaper by higher bond yields, as they would have to be discounted at a higher rate. (…)
Nobody care of these wars, as John Authers shows!
(…) the stock market now believes it can live with higher oil. For the first month of the Iran conflict, Brent and the S&P 500 acted as mirror images, with stocks gaining only when Brent fell. That relationship is over. Global stocks are now 14% above their level when oil first hit $100::
As this simple model from Absolute Strategy Research illustrates, if gasoline stays where it is for the next six months, US headline inflation should rise to 4.9% — a level that would more or less force the Federal Reserve to raise rates:
This seems truly horrendous news. Higher oil prices act like a tax hike to brake growth, and also require rate increases that weigh on growth. But somehow markets aren’t seeing it that way. One-year inflation breakevens are barely half their level when the $100 mark was first breached back in March:
Prediction markets reflect that hopes of a reopening any time this year are draining away, and oil futures disprove the positive assumptions of traders closest to the action.
“K” is the key. Consumers were first but the corporate world and the stock market are also about to turn K-shaped, as rising input and financial costs inevitably seep into non-AI sensitive P&Ls and P/E multiples.
Credit markets are already in K-shape mode:
More from John Authers’ column:
Almost a year after JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon famously complained of cockroach infestation, there are signs of financial distress in rising defaults. Fitch’s broad measure of defaults has shot up to 6% from 5% in 2024 as publicly traded business development companies’ also lost value.
It remains unclear how the credit cycle might evolve as more debt comes to market. Credit investors are set to be offered more than $138 billion of buyout debt in the coming months, with US issuance at its highest level since 2007 and European issuance at its highest since 2021. New supply is already visible in real time. At least seven companies began loan repricing marketing this week.Private credit has funded 82% of buyout deals so far in 2026, up from 61% in 2019. The question now is whether it can keep absorbing such a large share of the LBO market as debt supply swells. (…)
Another risk is that the portion of the $138 billion pipeline for debt where banks and private-credit firms share exposure could come under pressure as more companies struggle to repay their debts. Steve Caprio at Deutsche Bank points out that over 80% of B-rated debt sits in floating-rate leveraged loans or private credit, which leaves those borrowers in a rough spot with a big wall of maturities coming due.
Direct lending loans rarely trade, and their prices are hard to pin down, so weakening credits can go unnoticed for a while. If the markdowns arrive all at once, lenders will finally have to put a number on the damage. It’s still too soon to declare that the storm — or the cockroach infestation — is over.
Seems like a good time to go fishing…
Can Trump Really Pay Every Adult American a $5,000 ‘Dividend’?
During his keynote speech at the first Republican midterm convention, US President Donald Trump made an extraordinary announcement: He said he would pay every American adult a $5,000 “Trump dividend” if the Republicans retain control of both chambers of Congress after the November elections.
Trump said the dividend would have to be spent in the US: “We don’t want you going to Canada to spend the money, we don’t want you going to China, to Germany. You gotta spend the money in the United States of America.” (…)
If Trump paid $5,000 to every US adult citizen, the plan would cost around $1.2 trillion in total. (…)
Trump provided no information on how he would pay for the initiative. Unless the government raised taxes, cut spending elsewhere or found enough new revenue to cover the payments, the government would likely have to fund it with borrowing.
Last year, Trump floated the idea of mailing $2,000 “dividend” payments to low- and middle-income earning Americans funded by revenue from his sweeping tariffs on US goods imports, but the proposal never got off the ground. (…)
A cash payment program would require approval from Congress. Fellow Republicans previously rejected Trump’s tariff “dividend” proposal, and any legislation offering direct payments to voters would face a steep path to becoming law. (…)
Even if Republicans retain control of Congress, Mondschein said, the government’s already significant debt load and other competing spending priorities meant it would be hard to get support for direct payments to citizens. (…)
Mondschein said he would expect the inflationary impact of giving $5,000 to every adult to be “pretty significant”. (…)
Axios has this other one today:
Trump plans $500 Obamacare rebates
The Trump administration plans to send $500 rebate checks to as many as 1 million people who it says were overcharged for coverage under Obamacare, Axios’ Marc Caputo has learned.
The direct-deposit payment would be sent to people in 30 states before the Nov. 3 midterm election, as President Trump touts savings from his tax-cut legislation and prescription drug plan.
Trump’s ways of tackling the affordability issue, oblivious to any collateral issues.
Like how rising bond yields can push mortgage rates up 75bps since the war with Iran began.
Redfin’s data show that the median sale price is up 4.7% since the war started. Unsurprisingly, active listings are up 7%. But sales are down 5.9% YoY at the end of August.
