The enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it’s the illusion of knowledge (Stephen Hawking)

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so (Mark Twain)

Invest with smart knowledge and objective odds

YOUR DAILY EDGE: 7 April 2026

S&P Global’s Services PMI Shows First Contraction in More Than Three Years S&P Global’s purchasing managers index for services providers fell to 49.8 points in March from 51.7 in February

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(…) “Confidence in the outlook weakened against a backdrop of rising cost pressures as a surge in energy prices following the outbreak of war in the Middle East cast a shadow over the sector,” S&P Global said. Firms said the negative effect of the war on sentiment added to the adverse impact of trade tariffs.

“Clearly much depends on the duration of the conflict,” said Chris Williamson, chief business economist at S&P Global Market Intelligence. The fact business confidence dipped but didn’t slump “is a sign that businesses are hopeful of a swift resolution to the war.”

There remains a concern, however, that energy disruption may last beyond the actual conflict and test the resilience of businesses and households in the coming months, he added.

Chris Williamson had much more to say than what the WSJ reported:

“The service sector has slipped into contraction for the first time since January 2023, dragging the overall economy down to a near-stalled 0.5% annualized rate of growth in March.

Worst hit is consumer-facing service sectors where, barring the pandemic lockdowns, the downturn reported in March was among the steepest recorded since data were first available in 2009.

However, financial services and tech, both of which performed strongly last year, have shown some signs of weaker performance amid financial market volatility and concerns over higher interest rates, which have deterred investment.

“Key to the deteriorating growth trend is a pull-back in spending amid worsening affordability, with costs and selling prices surging higher in March amid spiking energy prices. The survey data are broadly consistent with consumer price inflation accelerating close to 4% as firms increasingly seek to push through higher costs onto customers in the coming months.

“The stagflationary environment of stalled growth and surging price pressures pictured by the PMI presents a major challenge to policymakers, especially with the March survey also indicating falling employment. Clearly much depends on the duration of the conflict.

The fact that business confidence has merely dipped and not slumped is a sign that businesses are hopeful of a swift resolution to the war. However, a concern is that the energy disruption unleashed by the war in the Middle East may well have an impact that lasts far longer than any actual conflict and may test the resilience of business and households over the coming months.”

The ISM Services PMI was much more upbeat:

In March, the Services PMI registered 54 percent, a decrease of 2.1 percentage points compared to February’s figure of 56.1 percent and its second-highest reading since October 2024 (55.5 percent).

The Business Activity Index remained in expansion territory in March but dropped from February’s reading of 59.9 percent to 53.9 percent, its lowest reading since September 2025 (50.2 percent).

The New Orders Index registered 60.6 percent, 2 percentage points above February’s figure of 58.6 percent and its highest level since February 2023 (61 percent).

The Employment Index contracted for the first time in four months with a reading of 45.2 percent, a 6.6-percentage point decrease from the 51.8 percent recorded in February.

The Prices Index registered 70.7 percent in March, a 7.7-percentage point increase over February’s figure of 63 percent and its highest reading since October 2022 (70.7 percent). The index has exceeded 60 percent for 16 straight months but is only 3.5 percentage points above its 12-month average of 67.2 percent.

Contracting services employment and higher inflation are worrying. Panelist commentary highlighted offshoring and cost-cutting. One respondent noted that lower US headcount was offset by higher employment in low-cost geographies.

Ed Yardeni shows how the PMI price index leads the PPI by about 6 months:

And this other chart that shows that PPI and CPI/PCED inflation are indeed correlated:

CONSUMER WATCH

Nonfarm payrolls rose 178k in March, well above expectations. Revisions continue to blur the picture. Payroll growth was revised down by 41k to -133k in February but revised up by 34k to 160k in January. Three-month average payroll growth now stands at 68k. The last 4 months: 47k.

Taking the weather impact into account, Goldman Sachs estimates that “the underlying pace of job growth now stands at 53k, roughly in line with our estimate of the breakeven pace of job growth needed to keep the unemployment rate stable.”

If so, employment growth will be 0.4% YoY in 2026.

Average hourly earnings increased 0.24% MoM in March, +3.5% YoY. Wages for production and non-supervisory workers increased by 0.16% MoM, +3.4% YoY.

Wages are thus rising at a 3.0-3.5% pace, bring labor income growth in the 3.5-4.0% range assuming stable hours worked, leaving little room for real gains after inflation which S&P Global puts at 4% in March.

Much focus is on the unemployment rate which declined to 4.26% in March, thanks to a 396k decline in the size of the labor force.

The unemployment rate is roughly in line with previous low points in 2000, 2006 and 2019 but the employment-population ratio, at 59.2 in March, is significantly lower than at previous unemployment lows and keeps falling. 

Only 59% of the US population are working, compared with 64.45 in 2000 and 61.1% at the end of 2019.

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Total employment only rose 0.16% since March 2025. That’s 260k or 21k per month.

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Running Out of Oil?

(Goldman Sachs)

As the last tankers that crossed the Strait of Hormuz before the war are reaching their destination, concerns about potential oil shortages are rising. (…)

Our three-way analysis highlights already critically low supplies of petrochemical feedstocks — naphtha and LPG — in Asia, with cross-product scarcity in multiple Asian countries in April. (…)

Asian countries in our sample (accounting for 1/3 of global refined products demand) typically source about ½ of their refined products supplies from the Persian Gulf, with South Korea and Singapore relying on the Persian Gulf for nearly ¾ of their refined products supplies (including via crude imports processed into products). (…)

Countries with large strategic oil reserves (e.g. China, Japan) are better positioned to offset the imports shock while other major products exporters (e.g. South Korea, Singapore) could respond by limiting products exports. (…)

Diesel and jet fuel prices have rallied most, with average global increases of around $130-140/bbl (150%). Higher price responses can reflect both tight current supply but also precautionary restocking, especially in richer countries  and even in the countries not directly affected by the Hormuz shock (e.g. the US). It also captures second-order trade effects for countries exposed to the shock via reliance on directly affected partners (e.g. Australia importing oil from South Korea and Singapore).

9. Diesel and Jet Fuel Prices Have Rallied the Most, with Average Global Increases of Around $130-140/bbl (150%) and Higher Price Spikes in Asia. Data available on request.

Source: Platts, S&P Global, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Source: Carl Quintanilla

Most deliveries in Africa have already stopped.

Most deliveries in Asia and SE Asia stopped yesterday.

Most deliveries in Europe will stop April 10.

Most deliveries in the USA will stop April 15.

EARNINGS WATCH

The Q1’26 earnings season begins this week but we already have this whose quarter ends in February.

The earnings of the 18 companies having reported exploded 86.8% on revenues up 17.0%.

The 5 IT companies surprised by 20.0%, the 3 Industrials by 13.7% and the 5 Consumer Discretionary by 6.6%.

As a result, trailing EPS are now $283.49 (from $275.54 in February) and forward EPS $338.29 ($314.77).

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Ed yardeni:

Despite the typical pattern of analysts’ estimates drifting lower as the reporting season approaches, their Q1 estimates stayed remarkably steady despite the war, and they have increased their forecasts for Q2-Q4.

Total forward earnings for the S&P 500 has continued to climb, even excluding the Magnificent-7.

The forward P/E of the Mag-7 is down from 31.2 on November 3, 2025, to 23.7 currently.

The IT sector’s forward P/E at 20.7 has now converged with the S&P 500’s 19.9.

This Is Starting to Look Like a Slow-Motion Bank Run

By Natasha Sarin, a NYT contributing Opinion writer and a professor at Yale Law School and the president of the Budget Lab at Yale.

Over the past few years, one of the signature funds at Blackstone, the private equity giant, has delivered, on average, 10 percent annual returns for its investors. The fund, which specializes in private credit, has lent money to more than 400 borrowers, who in turn have deployed those loans to become more profitable themselves.

And yet, in the first quarter of this year, nearly 8 percent of the fund’s investors declared they wanted out. Something similar has happened at funds managed by Apollo (where redemption requests hit 11.2 percent), Ares (11.6 percent) and Blue Owl (21.9 percent).

When asked on CNBC to explain why his investors are asking for their cash back, the Blackstone president, Jonathan Gray, blamed “noise” — a “disjointed environment now between what’s happening on the ground with underlying portfolios and what’s happening in the news cycle.”

He may well be right. Another explanation might be that we are witnessing a kind of slow-motion bank run. Investors, spooked by a litany of bad news, are rushing to pull their money out of private credit funds. If they all ask at once, these funds — and potentially the firms that manage them — could falter. (…)

Last October, I suggested that the failures of a few companies that borrowed from private credit funds were the first dominoes to fall and that more would follow. It appears that many private credit investors woke up to that risk — and now want to cash out. (…)

Private credit players may have made bad bets — the software industry might be one, given the impact of artificial intelligence on the business — but, they say, the sector should be free of runs. Losses should be contained to the investors in these firms, end of story.

(…) as private credit has grown, it has started targeting retail investors directly, in addition to big institutional ones. Mostly, that’s been wealthy people, but the scope is broadening. Last week, the Trump administration proposed a rule that would make it easier for 401(k) plans to be invested in private credit, following up on an executive order from the summer that called for “democratizing access to alternative assets.”

As private credit has gone more retail, the investors that make up its base look more like bank depositors. And they’re acting in similar ways, too, skittish and prone to panic. Although private credit funds explicitly limit investors’ ability to cash out on demand, it seems as if many didn’t read the fine print. It’s no surprise that in recent months, as the golden age of private credit looks a little less shiny, individuals are seeking to redeem more of their cash than private credit funds generally permit.

(…) Apollo is asking people to hold on and take 45 cents on every dollar they want back. Other firms are relaxing their redemption caps to meet investor demands, betting that letting itchy investors get out could prevent others from bolting.

If investors run, private credit firms will be forced to liquidate their long-term investments, much like banks were forced to do in the financial crisis. The potential fire sales of loans made to thousands of companies would be debilitating to the system, because they decrease the value of the loans that others have made, too.

Worth keeping in mind, for those nervous about private credit runs, is that the market is a relatively small sliver of the financial sector. It’s a roughly $2 trillion market, compared with a banking industry more than 12 times that size. That means the aftershocks should be smaller than the bank failures of the past.

But we run real risks that the financial system is more interconnected than we appreciate. Banks themselves are wrapped up in private credit lending. Loans that banks are making to non-bank lenders, a group of firms that includes private credit, accelerated more quickly than any other type of bank lending in recent years. That means private credit risks could easily cascade throughout the system. (…)

This blog started to warn about private credit, and private equity, last October 3 (Give Them Credit!) followed by Chris Whalen’s piece on January 2 (Credit and Freedom) and my February 18 post which warned:

And don’t presume this is limited to private credit.

The backlog of unsold companies in private equity is monumental. As the FT notes: “Private equity firms sell assets to themselves at record rate.” This will not end well. And the end may begin in 2026 as private equity companies fail in growing numbers.

The strong rally in silver and gold, and the weakness of crypto tokens, are leading the decline in US fortunes when it comes to the equity markets. Literally dozens of crypto ventures have failed in the past year, notes Comsure. Crypto exchange collapses have led to $30–50 billion in investor losses, the UK consultancy reports. But the greater concern is the mounting backlog of corporate insolvencies, a real and growing danger that could push the US into recession even as short-term interest rates fall.

This right when the US government is taking several regulatory and executive actions to “democratize” access to private equity and private credit for retail and retirement investors.

Among many measures, the SEC is exploring changes to the “accredited investor” definition to focus more on investor sophistication rather than strictly wealth or income criteria.

How will the SEC objectively measure sophistication?

Sophistication is not intelligence, and certainly not judgement (remember LTCM).

Wealth and income are much better measures of one’s ability to weather investment losses than sophistication. This is what the “accredited investor” definition was for.

But a president aggressively deregulating crypto markets won’t be bothered discussing regulations for small investor protection.

KKR’s view (one of the private lenders)

We think this Private Credit cycle will likely be more defined by recovery rates than defaults. During our travels, we heard lots of comments that defaults have only recently spiked. Our team has a slightly different view.

For some time, Kris Novell and the macro team have been tracking Fitch’s broader default measure, which extends beyond a simple missed-payment definition and includes stress events such as PIK’ing (Payment-in-Kind) of interest and amend-and-extend transactions to avoid a default.

(Note: payment-in-kind allows a borrower to preserve cash by capitalizing interest into the loan balance instead of paying it in cash, which can be a sign of stress if used to solve a liquidity problem, often resulting in increasing leverage and potentially lowering recoveries later. Amend-and-extend transactions work similarly by pushing maturities out, often with higher spreads or fees, which can suppress near-term default statistics but lead to more recovery-negative outcomes if the business does not improve).

On that yardstick, the stress rate has been fairly steady at around 5-6% in the past 2 years. Looking ahead, the key to this cycle, we believe, will be in recovery rates, which could land below the 50- 60% of prior cycles. It is hard to predict, but we think that number could actually be 30-40% in certain instances, especially for smaller companies and situations where the lender is not willing to take over the company, or the terms were too loose at the outset.

We believe the endgame winners will be defined less by who can chase yield and more by who can originate well, construct portfolios thoughtfully, and actively manage outcomes when Credit underperforms expectations.

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JPM’s Jamie Dimon:

Dimon said private credit “probably does not” pose a systemic risk. But he cautioned that losses on leveraged lending will be higher-than-expected in part because of “modestly” weakened credit standards.

“By and large, private credit does not tend to have great transparency or rigorous valuation ‘marks’ of their loans — this increases the chance that people will sell if they think the environment will get worse — even if actual realized losses barely change,” he said.

He also expressed some apprehension about the private equity industry, saying that it’s a “little surprising” that the alternative asset managers didn’t seize as much on healthy markets to take more of their companies public. Instead, some have been moved to continuation funds, he said.

“Private equity investments are now held for an average of seven years — this is virtually double what it used to be,” he said. “We have generally had nothing but a bull market since the great financial crisis — it’s hard to imagine what will happen if and when we have an extended bear market.” (Bloomberg)

“Probably”?

This is what slow motion means (Via ProPublica):

August 5, 2007: During a conference call with investors, various high-ranking AIG officials stressed the near-absolute security of the credit-default swaps.

“The risk actually undertaken is very modest and remote,” said AIG’s chief risk officer.

Joseph Cassano, who oversaw the unit that dealt in the swaps, was even more emphatic: “It is hard for us with, and without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions. We see no issues at all emerging. We see no dollar of loss associated with any of that business.”

“That’s why I am sleeping a little bit easier at night,” said Martin Sullivan, AIG’s CEO.

November 7, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG reports $352 million in unrealized losses from its credit-default swap portfolio, but says it’s “highly unlikely” AIG would really lose any money on the deals.

December 5, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG discloses $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion in further unrealized losses to its swaps portfolio, a total of approximately $1.5 billion for 2007.

During a conference call with investors, CEO Martin Sullivan explains that the probability that AIG’s credit-default swap portfolio will sustain an “economic loss” is “close to zero.”

February 28, 2008: In its year-end regulatory filing, AIG sets its 2007 total for unrealized losses at $11.5 billion. (…) The next day, CEO Martin Sullivan tells investors that AIG expects those losses to “reverse over the remaining life” of the portfolio. These losses, he said, were “not indicative of the losses AIGFP may realize over time.”

May 8, 2008: In its first quarter filing, AIG ups its estimate of its unrealized losses in 2008 to $9.1 billion through the end of March, for a grand total loss of $20.6 billion over 2007 and 2008.

May 20, 2008: AIG raises $20 billion in private capital to help with the growing problems.

August 6, 2008: In its second quarter filing, AIG ups its unrealized loss in 2008 from the credit-default swaps to $14.7 billion, for a grand total loss of $26.2 billion.

September 15, 2008: Standard & Poors cuts AIG’s credit rating due to “the combination of reduced flexibility in meeting additional collateral needs and concerns over increasing residential mortgage-related losses.”

November 10, 2008: AIG discloses that it estimates its total unrealized losses from the credit-default swap contracts for 2007 and 2008 at $33.2 billion.

This is when the NY Fed stepped in, deeming AIG too big to fail.

Trump’s Pentagon-first presidency

A bar chart showing TrumpPresident Trump’s new budget lays bare the transformation of his presidency, pairing a historic surge in military spending with historic cuts to domestic programs.

The most powerful populist of this century is at risk of becoming what he ran against — a deficit-spending interventionist asking working-class Americans to shoulder the cost of war. (…)

Even as Trump insists the conflict will end soon, his $1.5 trillion budget request for the Pentagon — plus an additional $200 billion ask for Iran costs — would lock in a wartime level of spending.

At a closed-door Easter lunch on Wednesday — accidentally live-streamed and then scrubbed from the White House YouTube page — Trump spelled out the trade-off in the bluntest of terms.

  • “We’re fighting wars,” Trump told guests. “We can’t take care of daycare. Medicaid, Medicare, all these individual things. We have to take care of one thing: military protection. We have to guard the country.”
  • He said the burden should be on the states, which may have to raise their taxes, and that it’s “not possible” for the federal government to fund all of these programs.
  • White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump was referring to fraud in federal programs, and that “his record proves he will always protect and strengthen Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.”

Trump’s new budget — more a statement of the White House’s goals than a legislative draft — would reorient the U.S. government around military power at the expense of virtually everything else.

  • Defense spending would rise 42% — a buildup the White House itself says exceeds the Reagan administration’s and approaches the pace of spending just before World War II.
  • The massive Pentagon budget is framed as a response to an increasingly dangerous world that predates the Iran war, and envisions permanent U.S. military dominance as a governing principle.

Non-defense spending, which includes categories such as public health, scientific research, housing and education, would take a 10% cut, or $73 billion.

  • The steepest cuts would fall on the EPA, down 52%; the National Science Foundation, down 55%; and the Small Business Administration, down 67%.
  • Agencies spared from the proposed cuts include the Justice Department, which would get a 13% increase to “maximize its capacity to bring violent criminals to justice.” (…)

The combination of foreign adventurism and domestic austerity cuts against the political instincts that brought Trump to power.

  • The coalition that delivered Trump his second term — working-class voters, older Americans, rural communities — relies disproportionately on the programs being compressed to fund the military.
  • Congressional Republicans face a brutal choice: Back a budget that guts programs their working-class constituents depend on, or break with a president who’s made loyalty the price of survival.
REGIME CHANGE!

imageA Truth Social post last month had Washington and media insiders scratching their heads: Why exactly had President Trump attacked The New York Times’ Maggie Haberman and some of her “associates” — when everyone in the West Wing knew that she and her reporting partner, Jonathan Swan, had been on book leave for months?

Now it can be told: Haberman and Swan were on the president’s radar because the two supremely wired reporters, stars of the news organization the president is most obsessed with, have been working for more than two years on a book that’s causing high anxiety in Trumpworld.

The book is complete, and Axios can reveal its title: “Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump.” It’ll be out June 23 from Simon & Schuster.

The cover is clad in gold. Publishing sources say they’ve conducted something like 1,000 interviews. It’s the Trump book that even Trump is waiting for.

The title gives a clear clue about the book’s thesis. For generations, American journalists have parachuted into foreign capitals to chronicle regime change. Swan and Haberman concluded they were covering one at home.

The publisher’s announcement says “Regime Change” takes you inside secret deliberations of a president who has “fundamentally altered the nature of the office he holds — and, with it, how the rest of the world understands American power.”

Behind the scenes: I hear that over the past few weeks, there have been private conversations in the senior ranks of the administration about leaks to Haberman and Swan from meetings in the Oval Office and Situation Room — including from this year.

  • Maggie — author of the 2022 bestseller, “Confidence Man: The Making of Donald Trump and the Breaking of America” — kept her role as a CNN contributor while working feverishly on the book (and mostly resisting her compulsion to file the breaking news that courses through her laptop).
  • Jonathan, talking to sources deep into the night, hasn’t been seen on TV since he plunged into the book.

On March 16, three days after that Truth Social post, Haberman and Swan were spotted in the West Wing. I’m told the president answered their questions in the Oval Office for an hour.

YOUR DAILY EDGE: 3 April 2026

Stocks: Was That The Bottom On Monday? (Ed Yardeni)

(…) The Middle East conflict is the latest test of the US economy’s resilience. If the war wraps up within the President’s 2-3-week timeline, the economy should pass its latest test.

Consider the recent batch of upbeat economic data:

(1) Initial unemployment claims dropped last week to 202,000, confirming that layoff activity remains at historically low levels. The four-week moving average fell to its lowest reading since the start of the year. Continuing claims edged higher, but the four-week moving average declined to the lowest since September 2024.

(2) According to the Challenger layoffs report, US employers announced 60,620 planned job cuts in March, up from 48,307 in February but down a striking 78% from the 275,240 recorded a year ago. Of the announced planned cuts, 25% cited artificial intelligence as the reason, up sharply from just 7% in January.

(3) The recent streak of better-than-expected economic indicators has pushed the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index into solidly positive territory since the start of this year. Economic activity was strengthening, not weakening, when the war began.

(4) But what about the Atlanta Fed’s latest downward revision in Q1’s real GDP growth rate to only 1.6%? We blame it on the weather. February 2026 was arguably the worst February we’ve seen in at least a decade.

Ed’s rear view mirror omits that retail sales, up 0.6% MoM in February in spite of bad weather, have been pretty weak overall, in real terms, since November. My own calculations say real sales are up 0.4% annualized in the last 3 month (Dec-Feb).

Goldman Sachs is even more negative: “Based on the details of the PCE and CPI reports, we estimate real retail sales declined at a 1.3% three-month annualized rate through February.”

Energy prices have surged since the war began, and the Cleveland Fed’s Inflation Nowcasting model shows headline CPI might have jumped 0.84% MoM in March and 3.25% YoY, a sharp step up from 2.4% in February.

A line chart that tracks Platts Dated Brent crude oil prices per barrel from Jan. 2 to April 2, 2026. Prices rose from $60.975 to $141.365, the period high. After staying mostly in the upper $60s to low $70s through February, prices accelerated sharply through March and early April.

Data: Platts; Chart: Emily Peck/Axios

Dated Brent price: the price of physical crude bought in the North Sea for prompt delivery within 10 to 30 days. Physical shortage is here.

  • What betting markets say about a ceasefire:

- Source: Macrobond

Source: Macrobond

Indeed Job Postings have turned back down so far in March :

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Firms weren’t willing to hire even before this crisis began:

“That lack of pricing power goes hand-in-hand with a jobs market that is in a much more fragile position than it was at the start of the Ukraine war. The US hiring rate (new hires as a share of total existing employees) fell again in February’s data released this week and is now not dissimilar to where it was in the financial crisis.” (ING)

- Source: Macrobond

Source: Macrobond

Trump Overhauls Metal Tariffs Altered rates on finished products made with steel, aluminum and copper could effectively raise costs for many imports

The Trump administration said Thursday it would reshape its tariffs on steel, aluminum and copper products, altering duties on finished products to help simplify compliance. The net effect of the changes could effectively raise costs for many imports.

Under a presidential proclamation issued Thursday, finished products made with imported steel, aluminum and copper will be tariffed at 25%.

The 25% tariff will apply to the entire value of a finished product—known as a derivative product—containing steel, aluminum or copper. That will replace the current 50% duty, which only applies to the value of the metal used in a product.

The 50% tariff will remain in place for commodity-grade steel, aluminum and copper products—goods that are mostly made of the respective metals. Some goods could be reclassified as commodity products if they are made almost entirely of the metals.

Additionally, products that don’t contain a significant amount of steel, aluminum or copper—less than 15% by weight—won’t receive a levy under the metals tariff regime. Instead, those products will be subject to President Trump’s separate, 10% global minimum tariff. (…)

Even though the tariff rate will be lower for many goods, the change likely means the cost of the tariffs assessed on many products will be higher. That is because of duties being charged on the full value of imported products rather than just their steel or aluminum content.

Despite that, a senior administration official told reporters Thursday the administration didn’t anticipate the changes would raise costs for consumers.

The move could also mean the U.S. government will take in more money under the steel and aluminum tariffs, which are imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. That could help partially offset the lower tariff revenues that the government has collected since the Supreme Court invalidated many of Trump’s other levies in February.

The changes are meant to make compliance easier for companies that have struggled to measure the value of the steel and aluminum content in complex manufactured products. (…)

No cost for consumers but more money for the government. US magic!

(…) Most aluminum shipments from countries that ring the Persian Gulf have been curtailed since the fighting started in late February. About one-fifth of the imported aluminum in the U.S. comes from the Gulf countries.

Last weekend, Iranian drones and missiles struck aluminum plants in Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, damaging two of the region’s largest producers. A production outage is expected to ripple through depleted U.S. aluminum stocks in the coming months, further putting pressure on prices—which have already been battered by tariff challenges.

“Nothing could be worse. Every time we pass on a price increase to our customers, the price of aluminum goes up even more,” Reitnouer, the CEO of the Reading, Pa. company, said.

Companies that buy aluminum to make everything from soda cans to car hoods have been feeling the pain of more expensive aluminum. At Reitnouer Trailers, rising aluminum prices accounted for nearly all of the 9.5% increase in production costs last year. The company doesn’t buy imported aluminum, but the metal is priced globally, so supply threats like the war in Iran are quickly reflected in its U.S. price. (…)

The delivered price of aluminum in the U.S., with assorted charges and the tariff factored in, is $6,100 a metric ton, up 83% from a year ago. The tariff and other costs besides the metal account for about $2,520, according to S&P Global Energy. The all-in price for Western Europe is about $4,160.

“We’ve become disadvantaged pretty significantly,” said Jeff Lehman, North America president for Norsk Hydro’s aluminum extrusion business. He said Hydro is losing orders to competitors outside the U.S. that can pay the tariff and offer lower prices because their aluminum costs less.

Arizona-based Awake Window & Door is one client that buys long, angled pieces of aluminum from a Hydro plant in Oregon to make frames for large windows and glass walls used in luxury homes. Scott Gates, Awake’s CEO, said the company’s cost for the aluminum feedstock used by Hydro increased by 70% in the past year. Gates said he had hoped the tariff on his foreign competitors’ windows would give Awake an edge as a domestic company.

That is not what happened. “The tariffs haven’t given us a pricing advantage,” Gates said. “Their prices went up, and our prices went up.”

Although Trump’s tariffs were meant to encourage more domestic production of primary aluminum made in smelters, just a few of those facilities are operating in the U.S. High electricity costs have been driving U.S. smelters out of business for decades. About 70% of the primary aluminum consumed in the U.S. comes from Canada.

Stocks of aluminum in the U.S. are estimated at 200,000 metric tons, about two weeks’ worth of domestic consumption, compared with four to six weeks usually. Shipments from Canada plunged last summer when producers there were unable to quickly recover the cost of rising tariffs from U.S. buyers through the market-determined delivery fee on aluminum. (…)

Some Canadian aluminum was diverted to Europe over the summer, and executives expect pressure from dislocated customers of aluminum from the Middle East to lure metal away from the U.S. market.

Meanwhile, domestic aluminum producers like Pittsburgh-based Alcoa have benefited from the higher prices. (…)

“The tariffs aren’t harmful any longer,” Molly Beerman, Alcoa’s chief financial officer, told investors recently.

What’s good for Alcoa ain’t necessarily good for America, is it?

Global food prices rose in March, driven by higher energy prices and an increase in freight costs linked to war in the Middle East.

An index of food commodity prices created by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization averaged 128.5 points in March, up 3 points from February, as disruptions from the Iran war ripple through food supply chains.

The 2.4% increase in the gauge — which tracks grains, sugar, meat, dairy and vegetable oil costs — marks the second consecutive month of gains, having risen for the first time in five months in February. (…)

Trump Administration Unveils Up to 100% Tariff on Branded Drugs

The U.S. will impose tariffs of as much as 100% on branded pharmaceuticals, the White House said Thursday, though nations or drugmakers that strike deals with the Trump administration or commit to build manufacturing facilities in the U.S. can receive lower levies.

The 100% tariff will apply to patented imported pharmaceuticals from companies that haven’t committed to invest in the U.S. and haven’t entered into “most favored nation” agreements to match their U.S. prices to the lowest they charge in other developed countries, a senior administration official said Thursday.

But the full 100% tariff might apply to only a few drugmakers or none at all. If a company pledges to invest in U.S. drug manufacturing in the coming years, its tariff rate will fall to 20%, the senior administration official said. The company would have to complete the factory by the end of President Trump’s term in the White House, the official said, or tariffs could be increased.

Additionally, if a company that has made a U.S. manufacturing pledge also strikes a most-favored-nation agreement with the Trump administration, its tariffs can fall to zero, the official said.

The tariffs will be effective in 120 days, the official said, during which time large pharmaceutical companies can commit to invest in the U.S. or make MFN deals. Smaller companies will be given 180 days to make investment commitments.

MFN deals have been announced by all but one of the 17 major drugmakers the administration sent letters to last summer demanding lower prices, and the senior administration official said he didn’t anticipate that any drugmaker would ultimately face the 100% tariff. (…)

Outside of the manufacturing commitments and MFN deals, some nations will receive lower pharmaceutical tariff rates based on previous trade agreements their governments struck with the U.S. The European Union, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland will be subject to 15% tariffs on their pharmaceuticals, while the U.K.’s will be 10%. (…)

Last year, The Wall Street Journal reported that the administration would exclude generic drugs from the pharmaceutical tariffs after months of internal debate—a detail confirmed by the announcement on Thursday.

The biotechnology industry’s main trade group warned that tariffs would hurt smaller drug developers, which often lack the capital to build dedicated U.S. manufacturing facilities.

“U.S. biotech companies have been eager to expand investments here at home, but tariffs, along with an uncertain policy environment and efforts to force ‘most‑favored nation’ schemes, work directly against that goal,” John Crowley, president of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, said in a statement.

Stephen Ubl, president of the drug industry trade group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, said: “Tariffs on cutting-edge medicines will increase costs and could jeopardize billions in U.S. investments announced in the last year.”

AI CORNER

Lawmakers in Maine are set to pass legislation freezing construction of large data centers, The Wall Street Journal notes today, as a ban on new facilities of 20 megawatts and above nears passage in the state Senate after advancing through the House of Representatives last month.

The Pine Tree State may soon have company: at least 10 states are preparing similar laws as rising energy costs and scant public support turn the political screws on data center initiatives. “I think Maine is the canary in the coal mine,” Anirban Basu, chief economist for the Associated Builders and Contractors trade group, told the WSJ. “Maine will be the first of many states to have such moratoria.”

Alongside rising political backlash, hyperscalers looking to rapidly build out artificial intelligence infrastructure face increasingly acute capacity snafus. 

Bloomberg relayed Wednesday that, thanks to shortages of key electrical equipment, nearly half of domestic data centers previously scheduled for completion in 2026 are likely to be delayed or cancelled outright. Facilities consuming as much as 12 gigawatts of power were supposed to come online this year, according to market intelligence outfit Sightline Climate but, as the fiscal second quarter gets underway, only one-third of those are now under construction.

AI-related outlays drove planned capital spending across the Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft quartet well above $600 billion this year, compared to $383 billion in 2025 and just $80 billion in 2019. With the unfolding energy shock set to jolt global commerce, a material downshift to those spending plans could catalyze a “really meaningful correction in all equity markets,” Melissa Otto, head of research at S&P Global Visible Alpha, warned Reuters on Tuesday.  “I think if the capex numbers get pulled back. . . that could be a catalyst.” (Almost Daily Grant’s)

Take Hormuz by Force? France and Britain Have Better Ideas

(…) The Old Continent had nothing to do with the US-Israeli war of choice, and yet the fallout is threatening their citizens’ safety, security and prosperity as diesel prices hit a four-year high and terrorism risks rise. Their efforts may even bear fruit. (…)

“The reopening of Hormuz is now very much the focus for Europe in the short term,” says Kristina Kausch of the German Marshall Fund. “There’s no appetite for doing this militarily without the US, so that means reducing Iran’s incentives to keep blocking it.” (…)

Saying “this is not our war” has been smart politics with domestic voters and a fully justified pushback to Trump’s recklessness and bullying. But the US appears to be belatedly realizing that arm-twisting and annexation threats are not the best way to get allies (and their military bases) onside after starting wars in their backyard. And Europe understands that it’s in this struggle, like it or not.

Its economies are at risk the longer the strait is blocked, with German growth potentially halving this year as a result. At the same time, the continent’s Gulf allies are being attacked by Iranian missiles and Russia has emerged as an obvious winner from the surge in oil prices, a loosening of energy sanctions and the depletion of weaponry that might be headed for Ukraine instead. (…)

The big unknown, of course, is the price Iran hopes to extract from agreeing to a durable arrangement for Hormuz, Antonio Barroso of Bloomberg Economics tells me. Tehran might demand an easing of economic sanctions. Its insistence that Israel and the US don’t attack again feels like an impossible demand. Iran says it is drafting a protocol with Oman to monitor traffic through the strait.

China, which also gets much of its energy supplies via the Gulf, could play a key role by offering incentives to Iran to de-escalate. Beijing has been enjoying the harm Trump is inflicting on America’s longstanding security ties, and there might be a chance here to step into the vacuum by helping the Europeans and Gulf monarchies. But would it be willing to offer security guarantees to Iran and expose itself to a possible confrontation with the US down the line? (…)

There might even be some upside for London and Brussels, as the UK and European Union are pushed closer together again by the antics of the White House. (…)

Wednesday’s TV Watch Party

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(Serge Chapleau, La Presse)

Hegseth Removes Army Chief in Latest Purge of Military’s Top Ranks

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ousted the Army’s top general Thursday, the latest top military leader removed in a Pentagon that has seen a purge of its top ranks under the Trump administration.

Gen. Randy George’s departure was announced by the Pentagon, which provided no reason for his removal. (…)

With the departure of George, Hegseth has removed most of the leaders of the military services, an unusually high turnover. (…)

Hegseth also replaced the top military lawyers for the services. (…)

Bloomberg reminds us:

Admiral Alvin Holsey, who led US Southern Command, also stepped down unexpectedly as Trump ordered a military buildup in the Caribbean to target alleged drug trafficking boats. US forces in the region eventually participated in a special operations mission to seize Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and helped erect a quarantine to better control the country’s oil resources.

George deployed during the Gulf War and later in Iraq and Afghanistan, building a reputation as an operational commander with deep experience across combat theaters. (…)