MANUFACTURING PMIs

US manufacturing growth weakest in seven months

The headline index from the report, the seasonally adjusted S&P Global US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI®), recorded 51.6 in February, compared to 52.4 in January. That signaled a seventh successive month that the PMI has posted above the crucial 50.0 threshold but was indicative of only a modest improvement in operating conditions that was the slowest in this sequence.

The PMI was supported in February by concurrent gains in both output and new orders. That said, the pace of growth moderated for both indices, with production rising at the softest rate since last September amid only a marginal increase in the volume of new work. According to panel members, high prices, tariffs and adverse weather weighed on both output and demand growth.

Moreover, where an increase in sales was reported, data pointed to a reliance on the domestic market as new export orders continued to falter. Exports declined for the eighth consecutive month and to the greatest degree since April 2025. Tariffs reportedly remained the primary driver behind the drop in exports, with particular emphasis on weakness in sales to neighboring Canada.

In response, US manufacturers exercised restraint in hiring in February, causing employment to rise only fractionally overall. A degree of excess capacity in the manufacturing sector also served to limit hiring, as backlogs of work declined.

Meanwhile, inventories of finished goods were unchanged in February, ending a six-month accumulation period. There was evidence that firms were looking to streamline stocks as part of cost-saving efforts given output and demand growth remained underwhelming.

Despite the muted start to 2026, firms’ assessment of future output trends was positive, with the overall degree of business optimism strengthening. The level of positive sentiment was the highest for eight months amid expectations of new product launches and business expansion plans.

Manufacturers registered a steeper deterioration in vendor performance in the latest survey period with reports of low stock availability, transportation delays and adverse weather disrupting suppliers. As a result, companies utilized input holdings, with pre-production inventories falling for the first time in seven months. At the same time, purchasing activity rose at a softer rate than in January.

Finally, tariffs and higher raw material prices remained a key source of higher input costs during February, with the latest data showing another round of historically elevated inflation – albeit slower than in January and below peaks seen in 2025. Selling prices were raised solidly, but at the slowest pace since December 2024 amid evidence of stiff competition limiting pricing power.

• ISM Manufacturing Activity Holds Up as Uncertainty Rises

The latest ISM data for February edged down just 0.2 points to 52.4 but remained in expansion, supported by strength in new orders, production, and supplier deliveries, while employment and inventories—though still in contraction—improved enough to pose less of a drag on the headline. (…)

The eye-catcher in today’s report was the near-12 point jump in prices paid with a jump in the share of respondents reporting higher prices (~45%). The release noted, “The Prices Index reading continues to be driven by increases in steel and aluminum prices that impact the entire value chain, as well as tariffs applied to many imported goods.”

At 70.5 in February, the level is just above the peaks registered early last year amid the roll-out of tariffs, but remains lower than levels reached in 2021-22. The consumer inflation signal from this move is also muted when you consider that metal prices are a big source of input cost pressure for manufacturers, but most households aren’t buying lots of metals directly. (…)

Source: Institute for Supply Management, Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Wells Fargo Economics

Of the components that do feed into the headline, three are firmly in expansion territory, led by new orders at 55.8, then followed by supplier deliveries at 55.1 and production 53.5. New orders and production both came down a bit from January and supplier deliveries rose. Take that with a grain of salt as this measure counts the wait-times and can be a bit of a head-fake during periods of supply chain disruption or trade policy uncertainty.

Employment and inventories are both still in contraction territory, but both notched modest gains from January and on that basis are less of a drag on the headline reading. Employment is now at 48.8 (up from 48.1 in January) and inventories is also at 48.8 (up from 47.6).

The employment component ultimately still indicates manufacturers remain cautious on hiring. Most respondents continue to report the same labor conditions month to month, and the report noted “The main head-count management strategies continue to be holding off on filing open positions,” emphasizing the no-hire, no-fire jobs market today. When the full February employment report is released Friday, we anticipate the economy added around 45K net new jobs, a more moderate pace than what has been registered over the past three months.

Source: Institute for Supply Management and Wells Fargo Economics

A final thought related to the recent geopolitical pressure. A theme within capex in recent years has been how the tech sector has commanded a larger share of investment. Computer and electronic products facilities in particular have seen a steep rise in orders and activity, helping offset weakness in more traditional areas of capex.

Much attention has appropriately been given to the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of this weekend’s conflict, but it is useful to keep in mind that while this shipping lane is vital for global energy markets, it is less consequential when it comes to the flow of trade in technology.

The Straight of Malacca is the primary passage for global electronics, advanced chips, critical minerals and other inputs predominantly sourced from Asia. For U.S. manufacturers, tech shipments from Asia cross the Pacific either directly to West Coast ports or routed through the Panama Canal to the East Cost. The negative effects to supply chains for high-tech capex should be limited.

Eurozone: Strongest rise in new factory orders since April 2022, but inflationary pressures build

The HCOB Eurozone Manufacturing PMI moved above the 50.0 threshold and into growth territory for the first time since August last year. Rising from 49.5 in January to 50.8 in February, the headline index signalled the strongest improvement in operating conditions faced by euro area factories since June 2022.

National level data indicated that there was breadth behind the upturn at the aggregate level. Six of the eight monitored countries saw expansionary Manufacturing PMI readings in February – the most since last November. This included Germany, which saw its sharpest improvement in factory operating conditions in close to four years. France was the only country of those six to see a slowdown on the month, with its manufacturing economy broadly stalling after a solid upturn in January. Spain and Austria were February’s outliers, posting stagnation and a marginal deterioration, respectively, when compared to the previous month.

Factory output levels rose again across the eurozone in February, marking 11 months of growth out of the past 12. A notable feature to the latest expansion, however, was that it was accompanied by a rise in new orders. Not only did demand for euro area goods improve for just the second time in close to four years during the latest survey period, but the expansion was the strongest since April 2022. Exports were less of a drag, as evidenced by a rate of contraction that was mild and the weakest for three months.

Nonetheless, manufacturing employment continued to decrease across the eurozone, in line with the trend since June 2023. With new work intakes growing, backlog depletion efforts moderated. In fact, the reduction in outstanding business volumes was the slowest in over three-and-a-half years.

Purchasing activity came close to stabilising midway through the opening quarter, with the retrenchment cooling for a second successive month. When receiving purchased products from vendors, surveyed companies once again reported delays, marking nine successive months of lengthening delivery times. Meanwhile, stocks of purchases declined further, but to the shallowest degree since the current depletion trend began in early-2023.

As for prices, the latest survey data signalled an intensification of inflationary pressures. Input costs rose sharply, with the rate of increase accelerating for a third successive month to a 38-month high. Output charges registered a back-to-back monthly rise for only the second time in almost three years, with the extent of the latest increase the most marked since March 2023.

Looking ahead, eurozone manufacturers turned more optimistic towards year-ahead growth prospects in February. In fact, business confidence rose to a four-year high.

Japan: Manufacturing PMI hits 45-month high in February

(…) Total new orders likewise expanded at a solid pace that was the fastest since January 2022. There were reports that more favourable demand conditions globally and new product releases had supported sales growth. Furthermore, new export business rose to the greatest extent since June 2021, with firms citing greater customer demand across key regions such as Europe and other parts of Asia. (…)

Higher prices for raw materials, labour and transport all drove a further rise in average input costs during February, according to panellists. A weak yen exchange rate was also cited as having pushed up expenses. While the overall rate of input price inflation eased from January, it remained sharp in the context of historical data. Companies generally responded to rising costs by raising their own selling prices in February.

The rate of charge inflation slowed from January’s 19-month high, but remained marked.

China PMIs are out tomorrow.

Canada: Manufacturing PMI hits 13-month high amid renewed improvement in order books

(…) New orders were a bright spot in February, with growth recorded for the first time in 13 months. A renewed upturn in new business reflected improving domestic demand, which helped to offset a sustained decline in export sales. Latest data indicated a solid reduction in new work from abroad, although the rate of contraction eased to its least marked since October 2025. Survey respondents again widely commented on headwinds from US tariffs. (…)

February data indicated a sharp rise in purchasing costs, with many firms noting higher prices paid for aluminum and steel. The overall pace of cost inflation was the fastest for six months. Factory gate prices increased at the steepest rate since March 2025, which was linked to rising raw material prices and the impact of passing on reciprocal tariffs.

U.S. Labor Demand Dropped in February

This is from LinkUp’s Toby Dayton:

(…) To be certain, our crystal ball is no better than anyone else’s; But we do have an alethiometer in the form of a very powerful and forward-looking dataset of job openings sourced every day directly from company and employer websites around the world that we’ve leveraged effectively to, among other things, forecast non-farm payrolls since 2010.

Looking at our U.S. data for February, total job vacancies indexed from employers globally dropped 1.7% while new job vacancies fell 5.6%. Job Openings in the U.S. are now precisely where they stood at the end of December – well below the normal hiring patterns in a functioning economy when labor demand typically rises in the first quarter of the year.

Total and new openings dropped in nearly every state.

Labor demand rose again in Manufacturing but fell in services declined in both blue and white collar occupations.

Based on LinkUp’s January data, combined with our expectation that January’s Initial Release for January will be revised down, we are forecasting a net gain of 70,000 jobs in February – slightly above consensus estimates of 60,000 jobs.

And with February’s decline in labor demand, our preliminary view is that job gains in March will be even weaker. As noted above, the U.S. job-making machine is beyond broken. It might even be beyond repair.

Xi Eyes Consumers to Lead New Era for China’s Unbalanced Economy

In coming days, President Xi Jinping and his officials will unveil the 15th Five-Year Plan, including a goal to spur a “significant increase” in consumption by 2030 — language more urgent than previous Communist Party calls on domestic spending.

With overcapacity cutting prices, a property slump eroding wealth and US President Donald Trump’s protectionist push going global, the old growth model is challenged like never before. To power the next leg of expansion, Xi must convince his nation of savers to spend more on healthcare, tourism and other services as the middle class swells to 800 million people.

Currently stuck at an estimated 41% of GDP, Bloomberg Economics forecasts consumption will grow to make up 46% of the economy by 2030. (…)

A sustained recovery in consumer sentiment and spending will require bolder policies and cohesive execution from the government, the BE economists wrote. That should include structural measures, including child and elderly care subsidies, more efforts to increase the birthrate, and anti-involution measures to boost demand and tackle deflation. (…)

While officials seem more committed in their rhetoric toward boosting consumption, it’s unclear how they’re going to achieve it. Households’ spending on goods is actually largely on par with the level seen in advanced economies — it’s just that the goods they’re consuming are often cheaper. That leaves making consumers spend more on services central to the rebalancing effort. (…)

Officials scolded by Xi for over-investing in high-tech sectors and infrastructure are now nurturing new revenue streams such as regional football leagues, tourist sites, and street food. And while there’s been glimmers of success — such as record spending over the recent Lunar New Year holiday — there’s few signs of a meaningful pick up.

There are structural, not just cyclical, reasons for the under-spending, too.

China’s social security safety net is meager, especially for those living in the countryside, which encourages so-called precautionary savings. The government’s social spending — including pensions, medical care, unemployment and low-income housing — was equivalent to 13.5% of GDP in 2024, Bloomberg calculations based on official data show, versus an average in OECD countries of 21.2%. (…)

More than 31% of disposable income is saved rather than spent, according to Bloomberg calculations based on government figures — much higher than the ratio in other major economies. (…)

Chinese leaders typically see consumption as a derivative of industrialization and development, rather than a driver of growth in itself, meaning even as they envisage an increase in consumer spending they’re also aiming to keep manufacturing’s share in the economy at a “reasonable” level in the new five-year plan.

“Old habits die hard,” said Morgan Stanley’s Xing. “We are in a period of profound global change — a multi-polar world marked by persistent geopolitical tensions, where security increasingly takes precedence over growth. This naturally reinforces the view that manufacturing is the foundation of national strength and that industrial chains must be more competitive and self-sufficient.” (…)

Per capita GDP now exceeds $13,000 and China’s middle-income group is expected to double to top 800 million over a decade. A low birth rate and population aging mean the greatest opportunity in services may lie in industries such as aged care. (…)

Qi Yunlan, a researcher with the Development Research Center of China’s State Council, identified elderly and child care, tourism and sports as among the areas where supply could be improved to encourage consumer spending. (…)

Opening up the health sector is gaining momentum, albeit gradually, as authorities look to unlock wealthy people’s demand for high-end services and tap the expanding global medical tourism market.

Last year, China’s first fully foreign-owned general hospital was launched in Tianjin. The owner, Singapore-based Perennial Holdings Pte, has developed four hotels adjacent to the institution to meet the needs of medical tourists. It also runs elder care projects with a total of over 1,800 beds in the vicinity — a model encouraged by policymakers.

To spur consumers, the government in July started providing subsidies for purchases of services including bathing assistance and rehabilitation nursing for some disabled senior citizens. It also began handing out childcare subsidies, while preschool fees are gradually being waived to ease education costs.

The initiatives fall under a new policy banner: “Investing in People,” a concept that marks a critical change in Beijing’s long-standing strategy of prioritizing capital-goods investment. (…)

FYI:

Morgan Stanley: “Historically, geopolitical risk events haven’t led to sustained volatility for equities. In fact, 1/6/12 months post these occurrences, the S&P 500 has been up 2%/6%/8% . (…) Thus, unless oil prices spike in a historically significant manner and remain elevated, recent events are unlikely to change our bullish view on US equities over the next 6-12 months.”

Economists Gauge Hit From Mideast War as China Seen Among Losers

(…) The main transmission mechanism to the world economy is via oil. Brent rallied as much as 13% to above $82 a barrel — the highest since January 2025 — before paring some gains in Asian trading on Monday.

Iran supplies about 5% of global oil, and a complete outage would lift the price by ‎about 20%, ‎Bloomberg Economics’s Ziad Daoud and Dina Esfandiary wrote in a report before oil started trading in Asia. Furthermore, about 20% of global oil supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and if that’s shut prices could spike to as much as $108 per barrel, they warned.‎

If sustained, those higher oil prices would hurt major importers including China, Europe and India, while beneficiaries would include exporters such as Russia, Canada and Norway, the BE analysts wrote in a note. As for the US, consumers would lose out as higher fuel costs squeeze incomes, but the economy overall faces less of a drag as shale has made it an oil exporter. (…)

If broader market upheaval is sustained, those with fewer buffers may prove vulnerable. Analysts at Citigroup say countries with low FX reserves, such as Argentina, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Turkey, “face heightened risks of sudden capital outflows and currency depreciation.” (…)

As for central banks, they’re likely to take a measured approach for now.

“What complicates the near-term further is that there will be a broad-based increase in global uncertainty, which may feed through into the demand side of the economy while inflation expectations pick up,” the TD Securities analysts wrote. “This argues for patience initially, but a willingness to react if and when the situation stabilizes in the Middle East.”

The FT:

In a marked escalation from the weekend, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refineries was attacked by drones, forcing a shutdown. Analysts warned the escalating conflict could now spread to energy infrastructure across the Gulf, potentially causing a prolonged rise in oil prices. (…)

Ras Tanura, which was previously targeted by Houthi militants in 2021, is the largest oil refinery on the Gulf coast and can process 500,000 barrels of crude a day. It is also the main export terminal for Saudi oil in the Gulf.

“It’s a huge escalation,” said Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator close to the royal court. “Saudi Arabia, which wanted to stay out of the war, will have to decide how to respond.” (…)

“Gulf energy infrastructure is now squarely in Iran’s sights. The attack is also likely to move Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Gulf states closer to joining US and Israeli military operations against Iran,” said Torbjorn Soltvedt, principal Middle East analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft. (…)

“The most feared scenario is not its closure [Strait of Hormuz], but serious damage to the region’s key oil and gas infrastructure.”

Analysts at Morgan Stanley said a significant amount of crude already outside the Gulf could ease tightness in the oil market.

Martijn Rats, an analyst at the bank, said Saudi Arabia had raised exports by an additional 1.5mn barrels a day so far this year, and calculated that the kingdom could sustainably pipe 7mn b/d to its terminal on the Red Sea, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. China had also stockpiled close to 1mn b/d of crude over the past six months to weather any disruption.

Trump’s epic gamble in the Middle East The US president’s goal of regime change augurs immense regional chaos

(…) he has launched a fateful war of choice. America, the region, and Iran most of all, may come to regret it bitterly if, as so often happens in wars, this one veers off its prosecutor’s script. (…)

But overthrowing authoritarian rule usually requires either ground troops or a popular uprising, the outcomes of which have rarely brought positive change to the Middle East.

Trump has made clear he is not committing the former; rather he has cavalierly called on the people of Iran to rise up.

Most Iranians undoubtedly would like a fresh start. But even if the regime crumbled — and this still remains a big if — the region is haunted by the spectre of Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011: the collapse of their dictatorships led to anarchy and civil war.

Iran is a complex multi-ethnic society of 90mn people with a potential for unravelling disastrously. Such a scenario is one of the reasons Arab foes of Iran have been wary of America pushing for regime change. (…)

Now fighting an existential war it has long prepared for, the regime has lashed out all across the region, targeting Israel and US assets across the Gulf, and disrupting oil flows. That bombs are falling on neighbours that had counselled against a US strike appears to be of little consequence to an Iranian military bent on revenge.

At some point soon, Trump may opt to declare victory in the hope of moving on. As former American presidents found out, it’s easy to start a war in the Middle East but much harder to end it. This campaign has been dubbed “Operation Epic Fury.” Epic Gamble would be more appropriate.

Ed Yardeni:

Losing Iran is a big blow to Russia, which received military equipment, especially drones, from Iran. China imports lots of oil from Iran and has invested significantly in the country. In North Korea, Little Kim is probably scrambling to fortify his bunker. China has seen America’s military might in action twice in Iran and once in Venezuela since the start of Trump’s second term. China’s leaders might now consider postponing any planned invasion of Taiwan.

In the Middle East, the terrorist proxies of Iran’s Mullahs in Gaza (Hamas), Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Yemen (Houthis) have already been decapitated once by the Israelis. Now they’ve lost their puppet master in Tehran. The Abraham Accords are likely to be expanded to include more Arab countries. (…)

As in Venezuela, Trump probably expects to be running Iran’s oil business from the White House soon. (…)

In any event, oil prices are likely to fall in the coming months, assuming this war is short, as it’s bound to be. (…)

John Authers:

The range of potential longer-term consequences for the American role in the developing new world order, and for the balance of power in the Middle East, is equally breathtaking. But there’s no template. The breadth of responses to similar shocks in the past has been varied, as Citi demonstrates in this chart.

The huge outlier was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which triggered a massive bear market. It was different from the others because it led to a protracted reduction in the supply of oil to the rest of the world. Shocks that passed quickly, or in which the threat to the oil supply was decisively countered, often proved to be buying opportunities.

What’s different about this incident compared to other recent conflagrations is that there has been retaliation, which has hampered other countries in the region and cost American lives. The longer an outright shooting war continues, and the further it spreads, the greater risk that this becomes a major shock that brings down a range of markets. (…)

The key issue is the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of global oil exports are transported. If Iran wants to close them, it can — at great financial cost to itself and to other Gulf countries. There are already reports of attacks on ships. Hubert Marleau of Palos puts the prospects for the oil price as follows:

A true Hormuz disruption would constitute a tail scenario, which could easily increase the price of Brent to $125 a barrel, whereas a quick regime change would oppositely restore normalcy and bring oil prices back to $60 a barrel. There is a third scenario, where the oil flows under threat not in an apocalyptic manner as OPEC+ increases oil production at an accelerating pace; but nonetheless in an escalating one, constraining supply and running the price to an $80 peak.

The third is arguably the likeliest. For now, the problem is that an interruption of some duration to oil supply, and therefore a hike in the price, is a given until there is greater clarity. Even though Iran has formally announced that it does not intend to close the strait, the impact on the flow of oil from the region is still significant, as the emerging markets investment group Gramercy explains:

Commercial shipping has largely paused regardless, as insurance underwriters withdrew war-risk coverage within hours of the initial strikes. Our assessment is that the binding constraint on oil flows is currently the insurance market, not a military blockade

On this basis, the immediate surge above $80 for Brent seems to make sense, and there is also no need for the price to move much further without material new developments. (…)

Winston Churchill: “the statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events”.

US Producer Prices Rise More Than Expected on Services

The producer price index increased 0.5%, the most since September, after a revised 0.4% increase in December, a Bureau of Labor Statistics report showed Friday. An underlying gauge that excludes food and energy advanced by the most since July. (…)

After the report, some economists bumped up their estimates of the core PCE price gauge to a 0.5% advance, which would be among the strongest in recent years. Others expect a firm, but more moderate gain. (…)

Services costs increased by the most since July, including the largest pickup in margins in data back to 2009. This likely reflects companies passing along higher tariff-related costs at the start of the year. (…)

Excluding food and energy, the January increase in goods prices was among the largest since early 2022. Categories such as engines, communications equipment, machine tools and a variety of metals rose sharply.

A less-volatile PPI measure that excludes food, energy and trade services increased a more moderate 0.3% for a third straight month. (…)

Friday’s PPI release got little media attention this weekend. Not as scary as war, but scary nonetheless.

• Core Goods PPI final demand spiked by 0.68% in January from December (+8.5% annualized). 6-month average +4.7% annualized. Tariffs, not included in the PPI, continue to percolate from importers to manufacturers. Are they finding their way to the consumer?
• PPI Trade Services, which measures wholesale/retail profit margins: +2.5% MoM. This is +34.5% annualized! Highest since at least 2010.

On a YoY basis, core goods are up 3.8% and services +3.4%, both on a solid uptrend.

Ed Yardeni has the chart linking Core PPI Final Demand for Personal Consumption with core CPI and core PCE inflation:

The US CPI for February is out March 11.

• How U.S. Businesses Are Shaving Billions Off Their Tariff Bills

One of the most effective plays is reducing the reported value of goods companies bring into the U.S. Importers may not be able to escape a tariff, such as the global 15% rate Trump announced after the recent Supreme Court ruling, but they can pay it on a smaller amount.

Typically, an American importer declares the value of the goods it brings into the country based on what it pays. If an American furniture retailer pays a Chinese trading company $300 for a sofa subject to a 50% tariff, it would normally declare that value and owe U.S. Customs $150.

But under a legal precedent established in the 1980s, companies that dig deeper into their supply chains can report what was paid in the “first sale.” Suppose the original manufacturer of the sofa sold it for $200 to the trading company, which then marked it up to $300. The American retailer can declare the value of the sofa as $200—the first sale—and pay customs only $100 in duties. (…)

When tariffs were low, companies often didn’t bother to investigate the first sale price because the paperwork required to prove it was considerable. Now podcasts and webinars have spread the word, and lawyers say the tactic is common.

Another method is “unbundling,” or carving out costs such as insurance or transport that generally aren’t subject to tariffs. Importers try to figure out what part of their import bill is tied to the actual manufacturing of the product—and pay the tariff only on that amount. (…)

All this goes a long way toward explaining why the tariffs haven’t fueled high inflation. (…)

In February, Sens. Bill Cassidy (R., La.) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D., R.I.) introduced a bill to end use of the first sale rule.

See how the White House keeps spinning tariffs:

“The Trump administration takes the integrity of the President’s tariffs with the utmost seriousness, and foreign exporters should think twice before attempting to undermine America’s tariff regime,” said White House spokesman Kush Desai.

EARNINGS WATCH

From LSEG IBES:

479 companies in the S&P 500 Index have reported earnings for Q4 2025. Of these companies, 72.4% reported earnings above analyst expectations and 22.5% reported earnings below analyst expectations. In a typical quarter (since 1994), 67% of companies beat estimates and 20% miss estimates. Over the past four quarters, 78% of companies beat the estimates and 16% missed estimates.

In aggregate, companies are reporting earnings that are 5.2% above estimates, which compares to a long-term (since 1994) average surprise factor of 4.4% and the average surprise factor over the prior four quarters of 7.6%.

Of these companies, 72.7% reported revenue above analyst expectations and 27.3% reported revenue below analyst expectations. In a typical quarter (since 2002), 63% of companies beat estimates and 37% miss estimates. Over the past four quarters, 71% of
companies beat the estimates and 29% missed estimates.

In aggregate, companies are reporting revenues that are 1.8% above estimates, which compares to a long-term (since 2002) average surprise factor of 1.3% and the average surprise factor over the prior four quarters of 1.7%.

The estimated earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 for 25Q4 is 14.3%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate improves to 14.7%.

The estimated revenue growth rate for the S&P 500 for 25Q4 is 9%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate improves to 9.8%.

The estimated earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 for 26Q1 is 12.7%. If the energy sector is excluded, the growth rate improves to 13.8%.

Trailing EPS are now $275.54. Full year 2026e: $315.36. Forward EPS: $314.77e. Full year 2027: $365.44

Revisions:

Guidance:

The equity market has broadened but only a few sectors are expected to post above average earnings growth:

Actually, Q1 earnings growth has been downgraded since Jan. 1, except for 3 sectors averaging +27.8% growth while the other 8 earnings are expected up 1.0%…