Judgement Call
The Commander-in-Chief of the most powerful army in the world was being briefed about a different kind of card game. Some of his advisers, all people he had chosen for their loyalty and dedication to himself, mumbled that they were not too hot on that idea.
That particular player was a bit of an unknown and would have the advantage of the venue. But Bibi was insistent. Bibi claimed to know that player inside out, he had a “solid plan”, it would be a “very short game”.
Someone suggested bringing friends along, just in case. Bibi objected. There were actually not many real friends, they were weak, and why share the glory? This would be his defining moment. With Maduro, people might forget or forgive Ukraine. The Nobel was back in sight after that.
And Bibi, so confident, said he would go alone anyway. Reassuring.
Not someone to share the limelight nor potential glory, knowing how to ace that game, he finally announced to his strategically cautious team “I just want to go.”
Per the plan, they quickly took many face cards off the hand of the opponent. He would surely fold quickly.
Somehow, he kept finding new cards, faceless cards to boot. Gosh, he had a plan, having long expected exactly that particular encounter.
Four weeks and Bibi and Friend are still at it, bruised by-standers pressuring to end the game quickly.
Newly invited “allies” refused to join such a complicated and increasingly desperate, if not illegal, game.
It’s now his turn, he is left with only 2 cards.
Some tell him to play his powerful War card. Bibi’s War card is already down. That’s all Bibi’s got, War cards.
Dropping that card would surely drag them all into a very costly, unpredictable chaos, with many terrible casualties, human, economic and financial, some maybe hurting longer term, like right through November.
Is he strong enough? Can he really bring this strange player on his knees?
Why is he playing that game, far away from home where he’s got so many other important things to do? He understands how crucial this next move is. He warned his friends at home: “If we lose the mid-terms, they will impeach me.”
This strange, actually not so well known guy can also bluff. Darn!
But is he really bluffing? “How can he bluff me, he’s got no cards, at least none that I can see?” Is he bluffing?
The fact is that this still faceless player is wagering his existence, with a well thought out plan, and a hidden number of War cards.
If he’s not bluffing and his own War card is not enough, how could he still claim victory?
Others say he should play safe and use his Diplomacy card instead. He’s also good at that, his more cautious advisers smartly tell him.
He already has his two “experts” trying to find an off-ramp with Pakistan, Turkey and others, some merely angling for future considerations.
At this point, he clearly would prefer to play Diplomacy, much less costly for everybody, isn’t it?
China would help, right?
But the faceless guy is tough, confident and very demanding.
Can he find a way to leave the game without anybody saying he folded?
Maybe he could get his Gulf business friends to play along. He could cease fire and task them to design some kind of a “Peace Plan” between themselves, the GCCs, Iran, Irak, Syria, Kuwait and Turkey.
After all, it’s their problem! He does not need them, does he?
He would be the power broker, tying them all together into an enlarged, more realistic Gulf Cooperation Council. Shia or Sunni, they’re all Muslims after all.
He’s a transactional guy. Let’s make a deal, dammit!
Winning with the War card looks scarily iffy, and tremendously costly, any which way one looks at it.
Not winning with the War card would be a US-made geopolitical catastrophe and, importantly, terminal for him and his legacy.
If he plays the Diplomacy card, suddenly morphing into a peace broker, he hands the game to the locals, does his best to mediate fair rules, then heads back home to mind simpler businesses.
Not losing is winning, no?
He would surely look smart, genius in fact, seemingly having planned it all.
What’s the alternative? War cards forever.
Oh! Forgot Bibi!
***
Back to reality, one might think one found the edge here: Trump the peace broker. Rationality timely popping out from chaos.
But what are the odds?
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The odds that he will understand the cost/benefit of all this? A true judgement call.
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The odds that he will not succumb to the warmongers, including Bibi and some GCCs imploring him to “finish the job”?
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The odds that someone around him has enough experience and wisdom to objectively advise him? Who among his survivor staff and generals are strong enough to tell him the truth and objectively set the odds.
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The odds that a Kissinger, a Brzezinski, a Kennan, an Acheson or a Baker will suddenly emerge from this White House? True, all deep state people, unlike Rubio, Hegseth, Witkoff, Kushner and Miller. BTW, how’s the Ukraine war going? How’s the tariff war going? How’s the immigration war going?
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The odds that, if he actually plays Diplomacy, nobody will try to sabotage the process?
Two outcomes, one with potentially catastrophic consequences vs one with potentially very positive implications. Call it Binary Poker.
As an investor, I am supposed to handicap and bet on this “game”. What I know of Trump:
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He has not always done the smartest thing in my book. Poor judgement.
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He’s impulsive.
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He can backtrack, smartly if not elegantly.
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He is very sensitive to financial markets.
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He understands the importance of the midterms, particularly for himself.
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He often goes more with the gut, less with the head.
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But his ego, his bravado. Dangerous combo.
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His team is rather weak, inexperienced in things not money or real estate.
Big judgement call!
The S&P 500 lost 9.0% since its Jan. 28 peak of 7002, half its constituents are in correction of 10%+. Bonds are down 5.7%. The war is very unpopular. Inflation is back, particularly on essentials. Seven months to November.
Is it enough to counteract Bibi, others like the Saudis, Rubio, even the WSJ Editorial Board?
What’s the downside?
Statistically and statically:
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The S&P 500 is 4% below its 200dma. Corrections often take it down 5-10%. That would be roughly 6000-6300 or another 1-6% decline.
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In bear markets: -15-20% to 5300-5700 or another 10-17% as Ed Yardeni illustrates:
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On forward EPS, a correction would bring the P/E to 18.6-19.6, still above its LT median (17.4).
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A bear market would bring the P/E to 16.5-17.7. A recent bargain but not a bear market bargain.
Statically?
Are forward earnings of $322, up 17% from trailing EPS, reasonable in the context of a prolonged, deeper war?
Higher inflation, interest rates, negative wealth effect, dangerous when the unwealthy are already contracting.
Using trailing earnings of $275.38 provides no comfort:
Judgement call! Particularly for those of us managing our own, or friends and family, money focused on absolute, not relative, returns.
A call on his judgement.
How lucky do you feel?
***
Back to our regular programs
What Are Trump’s War Options Now?
In this YouTube video,
Colonel Douglas MacGregor, former senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense under President Trump, warns that Iran holds a strategic advantage in the ongoing conflict with the United States. He predicts a massive offensive after the five-day ceasefire ends[extended by 10 days to April 6], involving airstrikes and attempts to seize Persian Gulf islands like Karg.
MacGregor dismisses the island seizure strategy as ‘World War II thinking’ unsuitable for 21st-century warfare dominated by precision strikes and surveillance. He states Iran’s ISR strike capability gives them the upper hand, making light infantry operations ‘suicidal’.
He argues that killing Iranian commanders has likely brought up ‘younger, more innovative’ leadership, and that global economic pressures from the conflict work in Iran’s favour. MacGregor believes Trump seeks a massive conventional assault to force Iran’s surrender, but doubts it will succeed.
The Gulf Is Divided and Sees Dark Times Ahead ‘We want a guarantee that this will never happen again.’ U.A.E. presses for a conclusive outcome to the war.
(…) The United Arab Emirates, which bore the brunt of Iranian missile and drone attacks, holds no illusions about a negotiated settlement with the current Iranian regime, which is increasingly dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The focus should be not on reaching a cease-fire, but on a “conclusive outcome” that addresses the full range of Iranian threats to the region, from nuclear to missiles to proxy militias, U.A.E. officials say. (…)
An Iranian regime that remains under IRGC control is no longer acceptable, Noura Al Kaabi, a minister of state for foreign affairs said. “We want to have a normal neighbor,” she said. “Do we want to get a generation that is used to being threatened by our neighbors? I don’t think this is a reality that we want to leave to our next generations. We want a guarantee that this will never happen again.”
To be sure, not all the Gulf nations have similar determination. Oman’s foreign minister Badr Albusaidi described Iranian strikes on cities like Dubai, Manama and Doha as “the only rational option” in response to the U.S. and Israeli bombing campaign. Oman was the only one of the six Gulf monarchies that refused to sign this week’s joint statement condemning attacks by Iran and its proxies.
Qatar, which hadn’t been targeted by Iran for several days until an intercepted salvo on Friday, and is now reopening schools, has signed the statement but adopted markedly more conciliatory language toward Tehran. The Qatari prime minister’s adviser, Majed Al Ansari, said Tuesday that Iran will remain a neighbor and therefore a way to coexist must be found, making it important to find a negotiated solution.
Still, the biggest Gulf states—Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E—as well as Kuwait and Bahrain are becoming increasingly hawkish. While Saudi officials refrain from public statements, they have made it clear that they view the IRGC-dominated Iranian regime as an existential threat to the kingdom, diplomats say.
“All the Gulf countries agree that this war is unnecessary,” said Althunayyan of Kuwait University. “But the divergence that we are seeing is that the strategic patience of some of these countries is diminishing by the minute. And if the Iranian aggression intensifies, these states will have no option but to confront the threat, neutralize it and re-establish deterrence.”
Iran has already pledged to hit power plants, water desalination facilities and oil installations across the Gulf should the U.S. target its electric generation infrastructure, as Trump pledged last weekend before announcing a five-day delay for diplomacy, a deadline that he extended by 10 days on Thursday.
The Iranian regime also threatened massive retaliation against the Gulf should the U.S. military—perhaps with the assistance of some Gulf states—seek to seize Iranian islands in the Gulf and near the Strait of Hormuz. The U.A.E. claims sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tunb that Iran took over in 1971. The Pentagon is considering sending some 10,000 ground troops to the region, in addition to the 5,000 soldiers and Marines already dispatched to the Gulf in recent days.
“There is no doubt that the region is entering a phase of uncertainty regarding its future,” said Sultan Mohammed Al Nuaimi, director-general of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, a think tank in Abu Dhabi. “The trajectory appears to be either a move toward further military escalation, recently reiterated by President Trump, or a continuation of difficult negotiations unlikely to achieve their intended outcomes.” (…)
On March 26, Steven A. Cook wrote in the Council on Foreign Relations:
(…) Joining the United States and Israel in the fight against Iran would invite additional Iranian retaliation and potentially more damage to civilian, energy, and military infrastructure. And in the case of the Saudis, it would put Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the politically awkward position of fighting alongside Israel. (…)
The Gulf states now have to contend with managing a radically destabilized regional environment. If the Islamic regime in Iran does not fall—and so far, it has proved to be resilient—the GCC states will need time to harden their defenses. The billions in resources it will take to protect Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh will detract from their plans for domestic economic change and regional integration.
Regional tension will also drive military spending, especially in air defense capabilities. The Gulf countries will also likely draw even closer to the United States to help ensure their safety and security.
It is almost certain that the rapprochement between the Gulf states and Iran is over, but for Saudis, Emiratis, and others to achieve their domestic goals, they need more than that. Iran cannot be able to threaten its neighbors and sow chaos in the region. But, even after four weeks of military operations against the Islamic Republic, that goal does not seem to be at hand.
On March 27, Jim Krane wrote The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf “Oil for Security” Deal
(…) What happens to oil-for-security when the fighting stops? Before the war, the US security umbrella was already fraying. The United States failed to prevent the September 2025 Israeli strike on Doha or the September 2019 Iranian strike on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq facility.
Under the Trump administration, the US security force in the Gulf has transitioned from protector of trade to instigator of war. As a result, US military bases in the Gulf are now Iran’s key targets.
When calm returns, Gulf countries will face a difficult reassessment of the growing risks of relying on US security provision.
On March 27, Dr. Ranjan Solomon wrote in the Middle East Monitor (my emphasis):
(…) Post the Iran war, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) faces an urgent need for a new regional security architecture, shifting from reliance on US protection to an inclusive “cooperative security model.” This structure would likely incorporate Iran and Iraq to prevent future conflicts, moving beyond the current defensive, fragmented posture toward a collective, stable, and locally-driven equilibrium.
Instead of deepening rifts, the new arrangement would prioritize a, new arrangement between the GCC states and Iran to ensure regional stability, with an, inclusion of Iran and Iraq in a new structure. The war has highlighted the risks of relying on US-Israel protection, prompting, GCC states to reconsider their security dependence. With, oil infrastructure and regional stability threatened by direct attacks, the focus is shifting to, protecting Gulf investments and preventing further conflict.
While Riyadh stands to gain from a weakened Iran, the potential for an Iranian state collapse or fragmentation poses a massive threat to regional stability.
A Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) without U.S. and Israeli dominance would likely shift toward a security architecture rooted in regional integration, featuring normalized ties with Iran, reduced reliance on foreign military bases, and increased strategic autonomy.
This shift would accelerate a pivot toward Eastern powers like China and Russia for trade and diplomatic partnerships. Gulf states would pivot from reliance on U.S. security guarantees toward regional security arrangements, potentially including frameworks with Iran to manage regional disputes. A major reduction or removal of U.S. military infrastructure – long considered targets by Iran – would likely occur, fundamentally altering the GCC’s defense profile.
GCC sovereign wealth funds might pivot from Western investments toward domestic development, infrastructure projects, and partnerships with Asian, Russian, or Chinese initiatives. The pursuit of normalizing ties with Israel, as seen in the Abraham Accords, would likely freeze or reverse, as GCC nations re-prioritize Arab and Islamic world alignment. The GCC might experience fewer retaliatory attacks from regional actors who currently target US-backed infrastructure.
The GCC could emerge as a more independent geopolitical actor, rather than one involved in or impacted by conflicts that are seen as foreign-driven. (…)
The growing role of Russia and China contributes to a more multipolar Middle East, where GCC countries leverage relationships with multiple global powers to meet economic diversification goals, such as Saudi Vision 2030, and security
In the final reckoning, this war has exposed the limits of power when confronted with resolve. Iran has demonstrated that endurance, geography, and strategic patience can outweigh brute force, forcing its adversaries into uneasy calculations of exit rather than victory. The United States and Israel may still command formidable arsenals, but their political will is fraying under the weight of an unwinnable confrontation.
What now emerges is not merely a military stalemate, but a shifting world order where regional actors reclaim agency. If there is a lesson here, it is stark: domination is no longer assured, and dignity, once asserted, can redraw the map of power itself.
This other video discusses Iran’s proposed GCC Security Alliance:
Iran Offers Security Alliance To Gulf Neighbours, Says Ready For Peace But Not Israel
Here’s what the IRCG said, verbatim:
Now is the time to return to our roots. We Muslims must return to the word of Allah, the Holy Quran. “Do not take them as allies until they emigrate in the way of Allah. If they return, seize them wherever you find them and kill them. And do not take any allies or helpers from among them.
(…) As an Islamic nation, with the strength of a well-established civilization and a world united by Islamic principles and the Quran, we must stand on our own feet to ensure our own future and the happiness of future generations.
O Muslim brothers, we do not need a state thousands of kilometers away from us to ensure our regional security. We do not need a state that, in its own words, sees Islamic countries as milch cows. We do not need a state that sees the security and interests of Israel as its first and last concern and sacrifices all other countries for it. We do not need a state that sees Muslims as worthless creatures whose land has nothing but resources, oil and gas.
What good has America done you? If you were to face aggression from the Israeli entity, would the Americans fire a single shot in your defense? As Muslims, we still remember well how fragile the alliances were on the one hand and the lack of a permanent force with strategic depth on the other hand led to the Arab defeat of the occupying power in the 1967-1973 war.
(…) Therefore, for the sake of logic, it is necessary to seek a comprehensive security union under a structured system. We should unite by ensuring our security and move towards a joint security agreement based on the citations of Islam and the Quran, which will be a solid foundation. (…)
“The Islamic Republic has announced its readiness to establish a regional military-security union without the US-Israeli presence. (…)
Gulf countries are increasingly frustrated with the US over the Iran war, privately questioning American security guarantees and expressing concern about the Trump administration’s apparent lack of strategy, according to people familiar with the matter.
One month into the US-Israeli conflict with Iran that they spent a year lobbying against, Gulf states continue to come under Iranian attack, with Saudi Arabia on Friday intercepting half a dozen drones and two Kuwaiti ports being struck. That’s as the Strait of Hormuz — a vital shipping corridor that’s an economic lifeline for the region — remains nearly shuttered, causing billions of dollars of losses in oil revenue.
Many officials are questioning US President Donald Trump’s rationale, commitment and aims for the war, and the value of hosting American bases that have made their countries targets, said the people, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.
Still, wary of angering Trump, none have voiced those concerns publicly, and there’s little prospect of them asking the US military to abandon its bases. (…)
Many Gulf officials fear Trump will cut a deal with Tehran that doesn’t curb its production of ballistic missiles or support for proxy militant groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the people said. They believe that outcome is possible so that Trump can declare victory and pull out of a war that’s unpopular in the US and has driven up energy prices around the world.
In such a scenario, the Gulf states fear they would be left to deal with an embittered Iran that maintains some kind of control over the Hormuz strait, the people said. (…)
One key frustration, said some of the people, is that their concern about Iran’s retaliation in the event of war was shrugged off by the US. Washington, they said, gave more weight to Israel’s arguments. (…)
In addition, Gulf officials were upset over a US decision to temporarily suspend sanctions on a trove of Iranian oil — potentially worth over $10 billion — on the seas in tankers. That move was to help lower surging crude prices but came with Gulf Arab states unable to get most of their own petroleum exported because of Iran’s threats against vessels sailing through Hormuz. (…)
Now, as thousands of drones and missiles fly over Gulf Arab cities that are meant to be havens for tourists and financial investors in a volatile region, some governments are talking about doing more to diversify their geopolitical relationships beyond the US and forging even stronger ties with China, the people said.
Beijing wouldn’t provide a security guarantee, but neither has the US, and its pitch over the past year as the more predictable superpower is gaining traction, the people said.
From various other sources:
- The Gulf states now have to contend with managing a radically destabilized regional environment. If the Islamic regime in Iran does not fall—and so far, it has proved to be resilient—the GCC states will need time to harden their defenses. The billions in resources it will take to protect Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh will detract from their plans for domestic economic change and regional integration. Regional tension will also drive military spending, especially in air defense capabilities. The Gulf countries will also likely draw even closer to the United States to help ensure their safety and security.
- The closure of Hormuz demonstrates that the Gulf is one of the world’s main resource regions, touching nearly every life on the planet. Access to the Strait should therefore be maintained by all, but it requires political stability to function. If just one of its eight stewards (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) is sufficiently aggrieved, it is now painfully apparent that that country can block the other seven from supplying the world, and from being supplied in return.
- Widespread opposition to the US-Israeli war on Iran may provide more shippers and governments a rationale to consider the Iranian option. Like the Gaza war that prompted the Houthi attacks, the US-Israeli war on Iran is exceedingly unpopular. Only in Israel do surveys show public support for the war at over 50 percent. In the United States, the war is the least popular of all US wars at their outset. International willingness to stand up to the Trump administration also appears to be gathering pace; governments may be pushed by urgent economic pressures to make the case for a different approach to Iran.
- As is often the case in warfare, the weaker combatant benefits from asymmetry. The task of forcibly reopening the Strait and protecting 100 transits a day is orders of magnitude more difficult than Iran’s tactics of making threats, laying mines, and launching inexpensive kamikaze drones that only occasionally hit their targets. Many observers believe that forcing open Hormuz would require a US ground invasion. Even then, Iran has other options for escalating its retaliation: Halting desalination and electricity production in US-allied Gulf Arab countries, blocking the Bab al-Mandab and Saudi oil flows to Asia, striking Hormuz bypass pipelines, or destroying further valuable and complex oil and gas export infrastructure.
EARNINGS WATCH
Trailing EPS are now $275.38, down $0.16 from the end of February and up 9.9% YoY vs +12.4% in February.
Remarkably, forward 12-m EPS jumped $7.43 (2.4%) to $322.20, up 19.9% YoY.
Actually, since December 31, 2025, trailing (actual) EPS increased 2.9% while forward (estimated) EPS have been raised 7.4%.
Looking at 2026 estimates, EPS growth has been revised up from 15.6% end of December to 18.8% with the largest increases in IT but also in Energy (from +7.8% to +12.8%) and Materials (+20.9% to +28.5%).
Since 1984, the correlation between PPI-Commodities and Headline CPI is 73%.
The inflation correlation chart below is particularly revealing. Commodities sit at the top with a strong positive relationship to changes in consumer prices, followed by natural resource companies and infrastructure.
Source: Carson Investment Research, Morningstar
When commodity prices rise for a long enough period, consumer prices get impacted. If this is what we get from this war, we could be in for a period of rising inflation, already well above the Fed’s target.
Earnings multiples would decline from rising interest rates and from investors expectations that the economy will slow down, on its own or with the Fed’s help.
Ed Yardeni:
While Israel is playing Whac-A-Mullah, the US is trying to find someone in Iran’s regime with whom to negotiate a peace plan. (…)
No wonder investors went into fetal positions last week. The good news is that sentiment is getting very bearish, which is bullish from a contrarian perspective. However, the fog of war will have to lift for the stock market to move higher. (…)
Bond Vigilantes around the world are responding to the oil-price shock and the worsening outlook for many government budget deficits, as defense spending will undoubtedly increase. (…)
Financials continue to weaken, a potentially ominous sign as this sector tends to lead the broader economy. (…)
The private credit market’s liquidity crisis continues. (…)
Despite the typical pattern of estimates drifting lower as reporting dates approach, analysts have continued to nudge numbers higher for Q2-2026 through Q4-2026. The war is being ignored almost entirely except for last week’s minor decline in the Q1-2026 estimate. That won’t likely continue if the Strait remains closed into Q2 earnings season.
Best of luck. Judgement day coming soon enough.
